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The vitality and growth of small to medium-size enterprises together with 
advancements of the Kenyan economy shows the need for government to respond 
appropriately in terms of revenue generation. The response should redistribute the tax 
burden to all stakeholders within the economy. This is because revenue or tax is used 
not only to fund education and health, which are key pillars for the promotion of public 
value in both the short and the long term, but also helps in supporting the growth of the 
local economy through development of infrastructure that supports the local business 
networks and cash transfers and subsidies which help induce supply and demand in 
local markets. Tax administration and policy should be among the biggest concerns for 
any economy looking to attaining public value for its citizens. Every country desires to 
have a tax administration instrument that is efficient in collecting taxes and a tax payer 
base that is fully compliant.  
This paper presents an analysis of imperatives and theories concerning the Informal 
sector with regard to revenue collection in Kenya. The aim is to determine the potential 
benefit of informal sector tax revenue collection by government for the public value of 
the citizens in Kenya and, in addition, to show the effect of informal sector income tax 
on public value if this is should be achieved by the Kenya Revenue Authority.  
The paper presents a comparative analysis of researched techniques to explore 
techniques that the government can use for collecting income tax from the informal 
sector in Kenya. It also highlights the current income tax system used by the Kenya 
Revenue Authority in the quest to collect income tax. It shall draw from secondary data 
findings and through analysis that Kenya needs to re-examine its tax administration 
and policy if it is going to make progress in increasing revenue generation from the 
informal sector as a tool to enhance public value. 
Tax compliance in the informal sector is an outcome of a cost-benefit decision. The 
choice of whether or not they pay taxes is thus driven by a simple-cost benefit analysis. 
Therefore, success of informal sector tax system is based on the efficiency of fiscal 




Die lewenskragtigheid en groei van klein tot mediumgrootte ondernemings, tesame 
met die vooruitgang van die Keniaanse ekonomie, toon 'n behoefte vir die regering om 
toepaslik ten opsigte  van  inkomstegenerering te reageer. Die reaksie behoort die 
belastinglas van alle belanghebbendes binne die ekonomie te herverdeel. Dit is omdat 
inkomste of belasting nie slegs gebruik word om onderwys en gesondheid te finansier 
nie. Dit is ook die sleutelpilare vir die bevordering van openbare waarde op beide kort 
en lang termyn, en help om die groei van die plaaslike ekonomie deur die ontwikkeling 
van infrastruktuur wat die plaaslike sakenetwerke en kontant oordragte sowel as 
subsidies ondersteun en vraag en aanbod in plaaslike markte in die hand voer. 
Belastingadministrasie en -beleid behoort tot die grootste oorwegings  vir enige 
ekonomie wat openbare waarde vir sy burgers wil bereik. Elke land begeer om 'n 
belastingadministrasie-instrument te hê wat doeltreffend is in die invordering van 
belasting en 'n belastingbetalersbasis wat ten volle meewerk. 
Hierdie navorsingsverslag bied 'n analise van die imperatiewe en teorieë rakende die 
informele sektor ten opsigte van inkomste-invordering in Kenia. Die doel is om die 
potensiële voordeel van die regering se insameling van die informele sektor se 
belastinginkomste vir die openbare waarde van die burgers in Kenia te bepaal en om 
die effek van informele sektor inkomstebelasting op openbare waarde te toon, indien 
dit deur die Keniaans Inkomste-owerheid bemoontlik sou word.  
Die verslag gebruik 'n vergelykende analise van nagevorsde om tegnieke verken wat 
deur die regering gebruik kan word om inkomstebelasting van die informele sektor in 
Kenia in te samel. Dit beklemtoon ook die huidige inkomstebelastingstelsel wat deur 
die Inkomstediens in Kenia gebruik word om inkomstebelasting in te samel. Bevindings 
uit sekondêre data en analise dui aan dat Kenia sy belastingadministrasie en -beleid 
moet hersien indien vordering met die generering van inkomste uit die informele sektor 
verbeter moet word om openbare waarde te verhoog. 
Die getroue invoering van belasting in die informele sektor, is ‘n voorbeeld van ‘n koste-
effektiewe besluit. Die keuse om belasting te betaal is dus gedrewe deur ‘n eenvoudige 
koste-voordeel analise. Die sukses van die informele sektor se belasting sisteem is 
dus gebasseer op die effektiewiteit van fiskale administrasie gekoppel met tegnologie, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and background  
Generation of tax is fundamental in the successful creation of public value by 
governments. Revenue generated from taxation enables the production and 
supply of goods and services demanded by citizens. It is in the best interest of 
the government to meet ever-rising public demands. The tax collection 
authorities must endeavour to collect maximum revenue from all potential 
taxpayers.  
Similarly, it is prudent for the government to ensure tax burden equity. Tax 
burden equity proposes that taxes be levied in an equal and equitable manner 
both horizontally and vertically. The government should strive to ensure tax 
burden equity in revenue collection from its citizens. All citizens’ benefit in one 
way or another from goods and services provided for by the government. 
Hence, it is prudent for earners from both formal and informal sectors to meet 
their tax responsibilities. The informal sector has been defined as an industry 
of employees not covered by labour or domestic legislation. The definition was 
subsequently revised and extended to cover all informal employment (Xue, Gao 
& Guo, 2014:85). 
The total revenue generated also provides a useful measure of a country's 
financial performance. Kenya has ambitious plans to become a developed 
country by 2030, hence the launch of the Vision 2030 agenda, which is aimed 
at improving the public value of Kenyans ' lives. The vision envisages the 
implementation of policies, programmes and initiatives to enhance financial 
efficiency, social welfare, political structures and a sustainable environment. 
Adequate income generation is essential for the government to realise these 
2030 vision goals. 
The government should then have an efficient and effective revenue collection 
authority. The Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) is a very vital institution in 
enabling the government’s success. The KRA was established by an Act of 
Parliament in 1995 (Kenya Revenue Authority Act). The purpose of the 




tax administration and sustainability in revenue collection. The KRA is 
mandated to maximise revenue collection to ensure that the government can 
afford the desired future. Kenyans themselves should raise the bulk of their 
public budget revenue.  
Kenya has been a democratic state since independence in 1963. The 
government of the day is elected by the people and for the people. The political 
environment in Kenya is highly volatile as a product of democracy and the 
opposition very visibly and loudly ensures checks and balances. The political 
party in office is under immense pressure to perform as promised in their 
campaign agendas and manifestos, otherwise risk losing out in the subsequent 
elections. Over the years, Kenya's literacy rate has also risen. According to the 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, it is now estimated at 72.16% 
(UNESCO,2018). A majority of the individuals are enlightened and know what 
they want. The erudite individuals are constantly pressuring the government to 
deliver on their manifestos presented in the election campaigns, so there is a 
higher demand for the government to deliver. Revenue is essential to fulfilling 
the agenda of government (Mpapale, 2014:12). 
In recent times, the Kenyan budget has continually expanded. Budget 2018 is 
estimated at 2.29 trillion compared to the ten-year-old trillion (Development 
Initiatives, 2018). This is a clear measure of exponential growth in the 
economy's demand for products and services; therefore, the government has 
no choice but to improve and create methods of raising resources to satisfy 
requirements. Increased revenue has also led to an improvement in public 
value; Kenya's standard of living has increased; government agencies provide 
access to free maternity care, primary and secondary education. 
The KRA's purpose is to evaluate, collect, administer and enforce revenue laws 
(Kra.go.ke, 2018). The KRA is authorized on behalf of the state and the citizens 
of Kenya to collect income. Kenya's tax structure was intended to depend on 
corporate tax; pay as you earn; withholding tax; value added tax and turnover 
tax as the main tax instruments (Mpapale, 2014:12).  
In the informal sector, Kenya's tax base still has enormous potential for growth, 




is the total amount of assets and income that can be taxed by a taxing authority. 
The KRA has long faced the challenge of collecting tax revenue for all the 
country's financial operations, particularly from the informal sector. 
Most countries in the world, including the developed world countries in America 
and Europe, are facing challenges in collecting revenue from the shadow 
economies that include informal sector enterprises. The informal sector 
continuously persists in carrying out their businesses without registration with 
the revenue authorities in order to evade taxation. With these businesses 
estimated to be about 15 to 30 percent of the country’s business activity, these 
countries are certainly losing out on significant revenue (Roux, 2013:24-25). 
In its 1972 report on Kenya, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) traced 
the concept of informal industry for the first time in Kenya. Kenya and Ghana 
were among the first African countries to exhibit entrepreneurship and 
enterprise.  
Kenya's informal industry is called the "jua kali" sector. Jua kali is a Swahili 
word meaning' scorching sun,' meaning it entails hard work and the individuals 
employed in this industry mostly work under the scorching sun. This has really 
resulted in the industry being misinterpreted and misrepresented. For example, 
it is assumed that the informal sector does not contribute significant income 
and/or profit compared to the formal sector, and that the income generated in 
the sector constitute of meagre wages. Kenya's informal sector businesses 
include lounges, kiosks, hawkers, artisans, goldsmiths, tailoring, and 
subsistence farming, to name but a few. 
Studies undertaken by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) found that the 
informal sector in Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for about 35 to 50% of the GDP 
of most countries. It has been estimated that the informal industry in Kenya is 
just above 30% and an important contributor to employment, employing about 
80% of the working population. The informal industry in Kenya is estimated to 
contribute more than 25% to GDP (Mpapale, 2014:7). 
The propositions above on the informal industry in Kenya presents the industry 
as a major contributor to the economy's overall performance. Consequently, 




contributes not only to job creation for the majority of the population, but also to 
ensuring that the particular majority is obliged to honour their revenue tax 
liability.  
Public value has varied definitions. Moore and Talbot define these as,  
‘… managerial success in the public sector with initiating and reshaping 
public sector enterprises in ways that increase their value to the public 
in both the short and the long run.’ 
                                                                                      (Moore,1995:10) 
‘Public Value then is the combined view of the public about what they 
regard as valuable.’            (Talbot, 2006:206) 
Government agencies do not secure funds by selling products and services as 
in private enterprises, but by selling to the electorate an agenda of creating 
public value (Moore & Khagram, 2004:5). Public value is therefore more a 
perception among voters of the value they derive from government. Public 
value is often obtained from resource utilisation and accountability and remains 
quite challenging. The task facing government managers is to measure and 
demonstrate public value. The subject of public value is not only an opinion held 
by government agencies, but also a view shared by the general public. It is 
essential for government to determine and measure public value (Moore & 
Khagram, 2004:8-23), but in addition to government, the general public must 
also agree that there is public value in their nation. 
Public value suggests that government representatives need to implement a 
general public good agenda. Government must warrant their occupation of 
state offices in democratic nations. Managers in most governments are 
authorized by their constituents to act on their behalf through a democratic 
process, with the goal of enhancing the welfare of people. Continuous dialogue 
and engagement between the state and citizens is necessary for public value 
programmes. Public authorities then use the principles agreed on to create 
choices that enhance governance systems and quality of life (Moore & 
Khagram, 2004:8-23). Government must take steps to enhance tax bases by 
implementing tax policies, initiatives and programmes aimed at enhancing 




1.2 Motivation for the research 
There are epistemic inequalities and issues of voice and power in knowledge 
production on taxation in and on Africa. This paper aims to fill the gaps and add 
onto the existing body of knowledge especially from Global South while at the 
same time acknowledging the Global North contributions in income tax 
epistemology.  
Like most other governments around the globe, Kenya's government relies on 
tax to fulfil the duty to generate ‘adequate’ income. The Kenyan government 
plans to spend Kshs 2.29 trillion. The government aimed to increase income in 
excess of Kshs 1.7 trillion, while project grants were anticipated to increase by 
14.3%. Approximately Kshs 0.59 billion total budget deficit (Development 
Initiatives,2018) 
 
Figure 1.1 Kenya's budget deficit 
Source: Development Initiatives based on figures in budget documents for 
financial years 2015/16–2017/18.  
The purpose of the government is to collect sufficient revenue to eliminate 
deficits and allow it to provide products and services that will enhance citizens 
' welfare, hence public value. The mandate of the KRA is to collect tax income 
on behalf of the Kenyan government and individuals. This is inked in Chapter 
469 of Kenya's legislation (Kenya Revenue Act) and in accordance with the Bill 
of Rights in 2010 Constitution of the Republic of Kenya (Constitution of Kenya, 
2010). The authority's duty is to collect tax revenue from all revenue earners 
indiscriminately, hence revenue earners from both the formal and informal 




the informal sector, and it remained a daunting task for KRA to generate funds 
from the sector. 
Contrary to the common view that Kenya's informal sector is a second-rate 
industry, in 2012 the Kenya Bureau of Statistics demonstrated otherwise. It 
determined that 25% of domestic GDP is commanded by the industry (Mpapale, 
2014:6-7).  
The Institute of Economic Affairs also suggested that about 75 percent of 
Kenyans are employed in the informal non-agricultural industry, according to 
the study undertaken in 2010. The Institute of Economic Affairs revealed in 
2011 that over 60% of Kenya's youth work in the informal industry. Taking these 
results into account, the informal industry is a very important contributor to 
Kenya's economy. Ultimately, this could result in economic growth and 
enhanced public value if the KRA tapes into it (Mpapale, 2014:7). 
Currently, the state has only succeeded in collecting taxes from the informal 
sector through pre-business start-up licensing and trade permit issuance, but 
the KRA has no scheme to monitor potential tax start-ups (Mpapale, 2014:7).  
1.3 Problem statement  
In their forward march to socio-economic development, a majority of African 
governments find the informal economy to be both fledgling and challenging in 
terms of collecting income tax. Taxing the informal sector remains an urgent 
issue. A majority of African economies therefore are fiscally constrained in their 
efforts to liberate economic restraint. The governments through their tax 
administrators are exploring ways to augment state revenue. They are targeting 
the informal sector on account of the continuous and exponential growth within 
the sector. This is because they have recognised potential revenue that is 
currently lost through tax evasion by informal sector enterprises (Ofori, 2009:4-
9). 
Kenya’s informal sector taxation has also remained a key challenge for 
government since independence. The size of the informal industry is not 
commensurate with the miniscule tax inflow. Engaging in tax evasion in the 
informal industry can take the form of misrepresentation to hide facts (i.e. tax 




taxes. Most informal companies in Kenya are not registered as official 
companies; therefore, the state does not have the means to assess and access 
their company operations. 
Furthermore, tax avoidance happens when people and businesses take 
advantage of the tax system's loopholes to avoid paying taxes. Tax avoidance 
relates to the legal means, wherever possible, of reducing tax liability. For 
instance, companies can use tax credits to decrease the quantity of tax paid. 
Many informal sector businesses either intentionally avoid tax payments or are 
not obliged to pay taxes because there are no specific regulatory policies in 
place to monitor the sector's operations (Siehl, 2010:9). 
Although the notion of the informal industry has been discussed since its 
‘discovery’ in Africa in the early 1970s, it continues to be used by policymakers 
and researchers as it includes the bulk of the global workforce remaining 
outside the domain of full-time, stable and protected employment. Currently, 
interest in informal labour agreements or informal labour markets is renewed. 
This present interest arises from the reality that casual jobs have not only 
persisted and metamorphosed, but the jobs are also in unexpected and 
disguised forms (Siehl, 2010:39). 
Several researchers looked at variables that were deemed to account for the 
informal sector's continued development, but there was no conclusive proof of 
these variables. Even the informal sector's precise definition remains a dispute. 
According to Schneider and Enste, ‘disagreement persists over the informal 
economy's definitions and assessment processes’ (Schneider & Enste, 
2000:24). 
Governments have made desperate attempts over the years to capture the 
informal enterprises efficiently into the tax net, but very little in that direction has 
been accomplished. The techniques of taxing the informal industry are full of 
seemingly insurmountable difficulties and weaknesses; hence the unique issue 
continues as to how to tax the informal industry in order to raise the necessary 
income for domestic growth. 
Again, it is probable that the informal sector will develop quickly than it is now 




operations. Revenue capacity is anticipated to rise dramatically as a result of 
public policy reforms. 
Kenya's development initiatives have not completely integrated the important 
role of the informal industry. This is partially reflected in the low efficiency of the 
industry, a feature that obviously reflects the fact that after 50 years of 
independence, there is still no extensive policy framework for an industry that 
comprises about 77% of Kenya's workers (Mpapale, 2014:9-11). 
Indeed, in terms of their corresponding income tax contribution to domestic 
growth, some elements of the informal sector have the ability to upgrade, 
graduate into the formal sector and formalise. The informal sector's unique 
fundamental social imperatives, such as minimal regulation; predominant cash 
transactions; non-existent or poor record keeping; itinerant nature; little or no 
entry barriers, etc., make the industry highly hard to tax. This scenario has 
facilitated huge tax avoidance of all types, including earnings non-reporting and 
revenue under-reporting. 
It is probable that the informal sector will develop quicker than at present if 
government can develop concrete policies to encourage the sector's financial 
operations. It is anticipated that income capacity will rise dramatically as a result 
of public measures to build the capacity of informal sector business (Ofori, 
2009:5-12). 
1.4 Research question 
How does the income tax system structure ensure informal sector contributes 
equitably to revenue generation and public value enhancement? 
1.5 Aim and objectives of the research 
Against the research question outlined above, this thesis aimed to review and 
evaluate studies centred on the future income development and governance 
advantages of informal sector taxation; consider alternative approaches for 
taxing informal sector companies; and explore technical and political financial 
obstacles to appropriate reform. The ultimate interest was not to advocate for 
or against the informal economy's increased taxation, but to consider how to 
make these systems more efficient and equitable. This is crucial in helping to 




advantages instead of adversely affecting formal systems (Joshi, Prichard & 
Heady, 2014:1326). This paper seeks to determine the possible public value 
advantages in Kenya from the taxing the informal sector. 
The following are the research objectives for this study meant to realise the 
aforementioned aim: 
i. Introduction to the informal sector and taxation in Kenya; 
ii. Understanding the informal sector and taxation; 
iii. Characteristics and delimitations of the Kenyan tax system; 
iv. Analysis of advances necessary for informal sector revenue collection to 
promote public value; and  
v. Results, conclusions and recommendations. 
1.6 Research design and methodology 
This is a descriptive desktop research on informal sector tax compliance for 
public value. The research was executed using published literature's theories, 
concepts, and numerical analysis. This involved collecting and analysing 
secondary data to determine the future impact and attempting to predict how 
the KRA will enhance the informal sector's income collection if it adopts 
plausible approaches suggested by studies. The use of comparative and cross-
sectional studies was also integrated by comparing distinct theories on the topic 
and also comparing the methods employed by other nations to enhance the 
informal sector's tax collection.  A cross-sectional research can be described 
as a strategy using a comparison of an occurrence in different parts to 
determine the likelihood of replicating the same result in a different context 
(Pesut, 1997:203). The research applied methodological triangulation to 
maximise the advantages of both qualitative and quantitative analyses. 
1.7 Rationale for secondary data and methodological triangulation 
This was a desktop research because of resource constraints, the study was 
based on a review of significant literature and secondary data. The study 
concentrated primarily on Kenya's informal sector and revenue authority in 
Kenya. The KRA, like other organisations in the public sector in Kenya, are very 
reluctant about sharing information and data with researchers owing to the fear 




using secondary data is that it enables learning opportunities and tries to 
provide alternatives for the study. While it is essential to note that information 
can be inaccurate, the investigator conducted a comprehensive review of 
literature on the topic and included propositions from both critics and advocates. 
The research was performed to maximise the advantages of both qualitative 
and quantitative methods by using methodological triangulation. The study's 
qualitative method applied is literature content assessment. The qualitative 
strategy offers a greater understanding of the study. Using two methods also 
complements each’s limitation. The quantitative numerical analyses strategy 
offers objectivity and includes statistical analyses. Methodological triangulation 
makes it possible to improve precision by cross-checking distinct dimensions 
of studies. 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
The first chapter provides a background to the study, the motivation for the 
study and the research problem, research question, and the aim and objectives, 
the research design and methodology that was used in the study.  
Chapter 2: Understanding the taxation and informal sector: A literature 
study  
The second chapter sets out to define and clarify the notion of the taxation, 
informal sector, and public value. This chapter provides a literature review on 
informal sector perceptions around taxation and public value. It investigates the 
income tax perception, perception of public value, and assesses tax incidents 
within the informal sector in Kenya. Definitions of key concepts, theories, 
approaches and systems are also provided.  
Chapter 3: Characteristics and delimitations of the Kenyan tax system The 
third chapter unpacks Kenya’s tax incidence, legislation and policy reforms, 
variations in taxpayer compliance and tax policy reform challenges.   
Chapter 4: Analysis of advances necessary for informal sector revenue 




The fourth chapter presents an analysis of findings for informal sector tax 
evasion, the extent of budget deficit due to non-compliance and the most 
effective responses to tax evasion in the Kenya informal sector. 
Chapter 5: Results, conclusions and recommendations  
The final chapter comprises the presentation of analysed and summarised 
research findings. Conclusions regarding whether the study met the research 
objectives are drawn and recommendations are made on how to improve 
perceptions held by informal taxpayers. The limitations of the study are also 
highlighted. 




Chapter 2: Understanding taxation and informal sector  
2.1 Introduction  
Significant literature reviewed highlighted the intricate linkage between the 
formal and informal sectors. Formal enterprises involve the informal economy 
in complicated subcontracting agreements in a number of cases. In most 
instances, the informal businesses are a conduit of the formal businesses, for 
example, most of the informal businesses are extensions of the formal ones, 
for instance, in their attempt to avoid taxation the formal enterprises have 
informal sector vendors in the streets hawking goods on their behalf. 
In view of these complexities and somewhat blurred lines, this chapter focuses 
on companies and their owners, including the self-employed, as they are more 
likely to have sufficiently high revenue to meet their tax liability.  The small and 
micro-enterprises that produce sufficient revenue to warrant taxation but find it 
easy to evade their tax liability due to their location, size and/or nature of their 
business. To understand both the motivations of such companies and the 
merits of taxing them, it is essential to bear in mind the concept of taxation and 
the wider consequences of formalisation. In the recent times, growing attention 
has been given to tax complexities within the informal industry in developed 
and developing nations. This section aims to present discussions and proposals 
on whether and how to enhance public value through informal sector taxation 
by highlighting latest state-oriented initiatives and innovations. 
The question of whether informal economy taxation is justified has been the 
topic of a long-standing debate. In critics ' perspective, tax revenue from 
informal sector is insignificant, with high administrative costs, and probably 
taxation of these firms is inherently regressive. Regressive tax imposes a 
greater proportion of taxes on low-income earners than on high-income earners 
(Joshi et al., 2014:1325-1329). Most governments in developing countries are 
cash-strapped, thus showing strong interest in the informal sector's future 
income generation. In addition, the informal sector is an important and 
increasing share of GDP (Joshi et al., 2014:1325-1329). 
Another dominant opinion is that development is adversely affected by taxation. 




resulting in decreased investment needed and imperative for development. 
These propositions suggest that an appropriate response by governments is to 
entice the innovators through tax subsidies to promote more innovation (Aghion 
et al., 2016:24). 
An alternative perspective claims that taxation is not independent of the 
financial and institutional setting surrounding it. Indeed, taxation is central to 
many elements of this setting: tax revenues fund government infrastructure, 
education and schools, legal systems, and much more. Entrepreneurs and 
innovators often depend highly on these government products, and greater 
taxation can boost development if it promotes greater public goods provision as 
it increases anticipated returns on entrepreneurial attempts (Aghion et al., 
2016:24). 
In the perspective of advocates, informal sector taxation is critical to maintaining 
the formal sector's tax morale and tax compliance. As far as growth is 
concerned, there is now some proof that formalisation can accelerate 
development for some informal sector companies and may have wider 
advantages for current formal sector companies. Lastly, with regard to 
governance, novel arguments have suggested that tax compliance by the 
informal economy may be a way for companies to collaborate with the state, 
thereby encouraging legitimacy, good governance and political accountability.  
The economy's infrastructure is an outcome of efficient collection and use of 
revenue by government. Such infrastructure aids the innovation efforts of firms 
that contribute to improve public welfare of the entrepreneurs and even the 
greater public. Taxation can be an instrument to contribute to a green, safe and 
sustainable environment. Depending on the policy's goal, such as reducing 
carbon emissions, weighted taxation is applied to various fuel sources that 
condition and change the preference of people and reliance on distinct sources 
of energy. Higher taxation tends to limit use of specific sources of energy and 
vice versa (Aghion et al., 2016:26). 
The second chapter sets out to define and clarify the notion of the taxation, 
informal sector, and public value. This chapter provides a literature review on 




income tax perception, perception of public value, and assesses tax incidence 
within the informal sector in Kenya. Definitions of key concepts, theories, 
approaches and systems are also provided.  
2.2 Taxation 
Taxation is a policy tool used to achieve public goals both socially and 
economically. Most developing countries have complementary tax and public 
policy objectives. There are five main purposes for taxation: first is to gain 
economic power for resource redistribution; second, for social development; 
third, is to enhance stability of the economy; forth, so as to have the ability to 
influence markets; and lastly to spur economic growth.  
According to Richard Bird's book' Tax Policy and Economic Development,' the 
three most urgent goals of developing countries governments are wealth 
redistribution, financial development and stability (Kayaga, 2007:6-7). 
Taxation does not always provide people with public goods and services. 
Governments have diverse and significant requirements that are all based on 
scarce resources (tax income). Nevertheless, tax payment is a shared duty of 
the state and all its citizens. This responsibility cannot be left to one 
organisation, industry or person to ease the tax burden and realise the 
collection of tax revenue. Every sector must take up its responsibility if the 
beneficial goods and services are to be attained (Mutua, 2012:9). 
2.2.1 Theories of taxation 
The following theories explain differences in taxpayer compliance with tax 
liabilities. To understand better the appropriate response to the research 
question this paper will examine the following taxation theories: 
2.2.1.1 Economic deterrence  
This theory posits that the choice on compliance by taxpayers is based on 
evaluation of costs and benefits. Taxpayers consider the compliance benefit 
and non-compliance costs. Tax administrators have commonly implemented 
these theoretical concepts in creating tax reforms. The theory's proposal 




benefits and conclude tax evasion implications as expensive express tax 
compliance attitudes (Ali et al., 2014:829). 
2.2.1.2 Fiscal exchange 
Compliance by taxpayers rises to the extent that they receive associated public 
benefits. There is a direct connection between adherence to tax liability and 
government delivery of public goods and services. The greater the level of 
public satisfaction and trust in the quantity and quality of products and services, 
the greater the tax morale and compliance (Ali et al., 2014:829). 
2.2.1.3 Foreign aid 
Most African countries are foreign aid recipients. Taxpayers are dependent on 
non-state donors for goods and services that should be ideally provided by 
government. As a result, their readiness to settle their tax commitments to 
government is jeopardized; they do not profit from government, so they have 
no regard for tax payments. Among others, non-state service providers include 
NGOs. They deliver products and services that the government would normally 
provide. These advantages decrease the probability of getting an attitude that 
is tax compliant (Ali et al., 2014:829). 
2.2.1.4 Social Stimuli 
This theory suggests that a reference group influences or infer the behaviour of 
people in society. Individuals in a society of tax compliance are likely to fulfil tax 
commitments. This is because their colleagues and citizens generally believe 
that they conform to the tax laws. The opposite is also true, there are high rates 
of tax default in nations with low tax morale. Tax compliance is more probable 
to result in equality and fairness in the administration of tax commitments by 
tax officials (Ali et al., 2014:829-830). 
2.2.1.5 Comparative treatment 
The theory of comparative treatment suggests that taxpayers compare the 
treatment they receive from the tax authorities against other taxpayers. The 
perception on how they are treated vis-à-vis others determines their attitude 




and fair treatment by government agencies, tax burdens are likely to be met (Ali 
et al., 2014:830). 
2.2.1.6 Political legitimacy 
This theory argues that the extent to which taxpayers trust the political class in 
authority influences tax adherence. Political legitimacy is an outcome of 
citizens’ trust in government officials and institutions. Consequently, citizens 
consider the social arrangement established to be acceptable and fair and for 
the common good. The higher government's political acceptance among 
people, the higher the likelihood of tax compliance (Ali et al., 2014:830). 
2.2.2 Dominant informal sector persuasions 
The informal economy, often for distinct purposes, can be regarded in either 
favourable or negative terms. The following are persuasions about the informal 
economy underscoring these differing views. 
2.2.2.1 The dualist  
The International Labour Organisation popularized this notion in the 1970s and 
subscribes to the idea that the informal sector includes marginal activities that 
are distinct from and not related to the formal sector. That the informal sector 
provides income for the poor and is a safety net in times of crisis. Further that 
the informal sector exists as an avenue for the poor to earn a living, at the same 
time act as a buffer for those laid-off from their jobs in times of economic 
recession.  This concept posits that the persistence of informal sector activities 
is predominantly due to the fact that insufficient formal job opportunities exist to 
absorb surplus labour due to slow economic growth rate and/or faster 
population growth rate (Ofori, 2009:9). 
2.2.2.2 The structuralist  
The structuralists argue that the informal sector should be regarded as smaller 
financial units. Informal sector workers serve to decrease input and labour 
costs, thereby enhancing the competitiveness of large capitalist companies. 
The structuralist model considers the formal and informal sector not only as 




capitalist formal sector accounts for the persistence and growth of informal 
businesses (Ofori, 2009: 9-10). 
2.2.2.3  The legalist 
The legalist posit that the informal sector includes daring micro-entrepreneurs 
who choose to operate informally to avoid the costs, time and effort associated 
with formal business.  Micro-entrepreneurs will continue to produce informally 
as long as tax payment processes are complicated and expensive. Arbitrary 
government rules and regulations stifle the taxpayers’ efforts in adhering to tax 
rules. The excessive demand imposed on companies by the enactment of 
countless legislations and regulations force many businesses into the informal 
sector. The simplification of formalisation process, rules and regulations can 
lower the level of informality among businessmen (Ofori, 2009:10). 
2.2.2.4 The illegalist  
The illegalist school, popularized by neo-classical and neo-liberal economists, 
subscribes to the perspective that informal entrepreneurs are intentionally 
seeking to avoid tax laws and taxation and, in some instances, handle illegal 
products and services. This school is linked to the notion that an underground 
or black economy is an informal economy. Informal businesses choose to work 
illegally–or even criminally–to avoid taxation, trade laws, and other formal 
working expenses (Ofori, 2009:10-11). 
2.2.3 Taxation in developing countries 
For this research, a comparative study was selected from South Africa, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. For the past two decades, these nations have 
implemented tax reforms with the primary objective of raising the tax base and 
enhancing compliance. With the exception of South Africa, the other three 
nations, face major challenges in attaining tax reforms.  
Similarities and differences in these countries provide profound understanding 
of improvement in tax compliance within the informal sector. The informal sector 
in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is mainly comprised of unregistered 
organisations such as small-scale traders, small-scale producers, small-scale 
miners’, farmers, restaurants, and food suppliers (TJN-A, 2012:6). However, 




economists and accountants also work informally. A significant number of these 
professionals have fulltime formal jobs but also engage in informal part-time 
work (TJN-A, 2012:6-12). 
The informal economy is estimated to be significant in East African states, 
indicating that a substantial amount of revenue is lost when they are not taxed. 
Because of the features and characteristics of East Africa’s informal sector, 
which among other variables, includes minimal transactions, and the reluctance 
to maintain business records, it is highly difficult to tax the players in the sector 
(TJN-A,2012:8-12). 
2.2.3.1 South Africa 
This nation provides an exciting comparison as it has a more advanced and 
comprehensive tax system. South Africa has a GDP per capita that is 
comparatively greater than the three other nations analysed here. South Africa, 
however, faces high levels of inequality in terms of income. Moreover, South 
Africa has a relatively high level of democratic governance. The tax revenue 
produced in 2011 represented 27.3 percent of GDP. 
 Like Kenya and the other two nations, South Africa faces the challenge of 
informal sector tax evasion. To curb this, successful taxpayer outreach and 
education programmes have been introduced by the South African Revenue 
Services (SARS). SARS has also implemented enforcement policies to alter 
the attitudes and behaviours of people towards taxation (Ali et al., 2014:830).  
2.2.3.2 Kenya 
Kenya's tax income in 2011, second after South Africa, was estimated at 20.1% 
of GDP. Although this proportion is significantly greater than in most African 
nations, Kenya's tax burden distribution is extremely uneven, leaving a big part 
of the economy untaxed. Kenya is a democratic state, although the level of 
democracy is at a slightly lower level compared to South Africa. Unlike South 
Africa, Kenya continues to jostle with low revenue equity (Ali et al., 2014:830). 
In order to substitute both income tax and VAT, Kenya levies a 3% flat turnover 
rate on turnover of KShs 5 million and above. The development of a streamlined 
single license for small companies has enhanced circumstances for these 




More latest study has shown that newly licensed companies are still subject to 
corruption and harassment by government authorities in some instances. 
However, the follow-up study is restricted, the long-term impact of reform has 
not been determined (Joshi et al., 2014:1335). 
2.2.3.3 Tanzania 
The government of Tanzania has been working tirelessly through the Revenue 
Authority to improve tax compliance. The tax to GDP ratio was at 15.2 percent 
in 2011. High levels of noncompliance have resulted in the country’s 
dependency on foreign aid. The African Development Bank (2010) estimated 
that foreign aid comprises approximately 34 percent of the total government 
budget (Ali et al., 2014:830). Tanzania operates a system in which tax is a 
progressively increasing proportion of turnover, and those without adequate 
records pay a larger amount (Joshi et al., 2014:1333).  
Tanzania’s privatisation of government enterprises led to massive 
retrenchment from government institutions leading to expansion of informal 
sector. Consequently, public sector is no longer the major employer and the 
inability of the labour market to absorb the unemployed, forced the unemployed 
to resort to informal employment. Formal sector employees also struggle to 
make ends meet due to the low income associated with formal employment and 
they look for more rewarding opportunities within the informal sector (TJN-A, 
2012:10-12). 
2.2.3.4 Uganda 
Uganda has a tax-to-GDP ratio of 12.9 percent, which is very small compared 
with South Africa, Kenya, and Tanzania. Unlike the rest, Uganda is the least 
democratic. For more than three decades, the nation has had the same 
presidency (Ali et al., 2014:830). A significant fragment of the informal sector in 
Uganda is illegitimately exempted from taxation and compliance with tax 
legislation in exchange for votes (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012:266).  
Uganda introduced the simplified single business permit as a form of registering 
small firms through a pilot project. The pilot project resulted in a 43 percent 




reform has not been reflected due to limited follow-up research in Uganda 
(Joshi et al., 2014:1335). 
Table 1.1 Reasons for tax evasion (percentage of sample) 
  
South 
Africa  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda 
Unfair tax system  8 8 11 11 
Taxes are too high  22 23 25 28 
Taxes are unaffordable  27 26 25 29 
Poor public services  12 9 16 11 
Government wastes/steals taxes  11 10 9 8 
People know they will not get caught  1 2 2 1 
Other  20 23 12 12 
Total  100 100 100 100 
 
The findings presented in Table 1 were determined through a study conducted 
by Ali et al., (2014).  
The table summarizes the reasons why informal sector enterprises fail to meet 
their tax obligations.  
The unfair tax scheme adds an average of 10 percent to tax evasion, as 
informal companies in these four nations regard the tax scheme as unfair and 
biased. 
One in four informal industry companies in all four nations have low tax morale 
because they perceive that the taxes are exorbitant.  
The view of tax affordability has the biggest impact on compliance or non-
adherence to tax liability. When observed to be too high, most informal 
businesses opt for evasion or avoidance. 
Most Tanzanian companies do not meet tax obligations because they consider 
their government's public-value goods and services to be of poor quality and 
quantity. In South Africa, Uganda and Kenya, the same trend is noted. 
South Africa and Kenya are suffering the largest proportion of government 




informal firms will motivate tax evasion by citing government officials ' misuse 
of tax revenue. 
The number of individuals who know they will not be caught is a clear indication 
that all four nations have powerful detection ability and stringent tax violator 
legislation. An average of over 98.5 percent of tax evaders have a perception 
that if they are discovered to be tax offenders, legal action will be taken against 
them. 
2.3 Taxation and public value 
If taxpayers are considerably satisfied with the public services of their 
governments they are likely to meet tax commitments (Ali, Fjeldstad & Sjursen, 
2014: 829). 
Recent literature suggests that informal sector taxation may yield long-term and 
substantial advantages for public value. Taxing informal businesses leads to 
enhanced income, economic growth, and quality governance. There is also 
some proof that informal sector taxation can lead to enhanced mobilisation and 
accountability for the public. Taxation in the informal sector could also be an 
imperative for extending citizens ' political voices (Joshi et al., 2014:1325-
1341). 
2.3.1 Financing public value 
The government budget balance required for public goods and services 
expenditure (Bt) in a specified year (t) depends on government revenue (Rt) 
and expenditure (Et) for that year: 
Equation 2.1 
Bt = Rt - Et 
If Bt > 0, that year's budget surplus is due to the state collecting more by 
taxation than it spends. If Bt < 0, a budget deficit denotes that the state has 
spent more than it has generated by taxation (Vargas-Silva, 2015:848). 
A key causal variable for people's choice to work or not to work in the informal 
economy is also the provision and, in particular, quality public sector facilities. 
World Bank government-efficiency indicators capture public service quality 




2.5, with greater scores corresponding to better results (Schneider et al., 
2010:443-461). 
One-hundred percent tax compliance in the real world is neither realistic nor 
desirable. The key issues for policymakers are about what goods and in what 
amounts governments should provide, and what amount and combination of 
taxes should be used to pay for them. Substantial tax evasion by the informal 
sector can lead to a reduction in government revenue, which in turn reduces 
the quality and quantity of goods and service provided. For example, owing to 
limited income, government facilities and tax management schemes can be 
jeopardized. This can ultimately lead to a rise in the formal sector tax rates. It 
propagates even greater incentives for informal businesses to take part in the 
shadow economy over the longer term (Schneider, Buehn & Montenegro, 
2010:443-461). 
Smaller informal economies exist in nations with reduced compliance cost, 
lower tax rates, fewer legislations and bribery; nations where the rule of law is 
respected and upheld, and tax revenue funded (Schneider et al., 2010:443-
461). 
2.4 Informal sector perceptions  
Activity of informal companies are beneficial on the economy and public value. 
Informal businesses largely perceive taxation as a hindrance to their growth in 
an already hostile business environment. A majority of these enterprises do not 
adhere to the tax requirements, citing unconducive business environment, 
corruption, unfair treatment and provision of public goods and services of poor 
quality and quantity (Kireenko & Nevzorova, 2015:560-574). 
2.4.1 Informal sector perceptions on public value 
There has been no exhaustive conclusion on the effect of the informal sector 
on quality of life from prior research (Kireenko & Nevzorova, 2015:560). 
Informal sector has both beneficial and negative effects on the economy and 
public value. For example, by raising total revenue through informal sector 
taxation, it positively impacts the standard of living. However, tax non-




Nevzorova, 2015:560). Taxpayers who are more satisfied with their 
governments are more likely to continue to meet their tax obligations (Ali et al., 
2014:829). 
In developing nations where low levels of corruption and higher taxes lead in 
high-quality public services and products, companies in the informal sector are 
opting for the formal sector. A majority of companies are encouraged to enter 
the formal economy even when competitive pressure rises as they have faith in 
their governments to provide economic growth and survival environments 
(Corbacho, Cibils & Lora, 2013:79). 
Governments must emphasize taxation in order to provide infrastructure, 
encourage growth and welfare and satisfy the ever-expanding requirements of 
people, as it is their main source of income. Income tax is the backbone of most 
of the world's tax systems. It is the largest source of revenue in most countries 
and a major agent for redistribution of wealth (Corbacho et al., 2013:79). 
In most countries around the globe, personal income is an important pillar of 
revenue generation due to its ability to increase revenue. It is estimated that 
personal income earned in 2012 contributed 8.4% to developed countries ' 
GDP, whereas personal income in developing nations produced 1.4% of GDP 
(Corbacho et al., 2013:115).  
In a country's search for efficient revenue collection for use in meeting public 
requirements, tax systems are basic instruments. Government-generated 
revenue helps provide social facilities, safety, and a politically and economically 
conducive climate in general. Taxation is also used as a means of redistribution 
of wealth in society (Akintoye & Tashie, 2013:224). 
In other cases, taxation has been used as a regulatory instrument to encourage 
or prevent certain company trends that threaten citizens ' well-being. This 
approach could affect the informal enterprises ' perception of government 
intention positively or negatively. Tax morale does not always rise when 
government introduces tax laws to satisfy business and individual 
requirements. The tax morale sometimes reduces when participants consider 





Government funds infrastructure construction to open up markets that lead to 
economic growth for trade effectiveness. A favourable environment for 
innovation and capital formation is also provided by the government. In addition, 
as government grows bigger, programmes for social welfare and wealth 
redistribution are at the top of the agenda. These programmes require greater 
taxation levels, hence law of diminishing returns (Vedder, 2001:1). 
The state utilises tax funds to enact legislation and regulations to protect 
individual property rights and protect people from losing their profits to theft and 
foreign intruders. If the business climate is secure for trade, companies are 
responsive to government (Vedder, 2001:1). 
Taxation is a policy tool used to achieve both government's social and 
economic goals. Most developing countries have additional fiscal and public 
policy goals. There are five goals of public income tax collection to 
communicate to all taxpayers; to gain financial authority for resource allocation, 
social development, financial stability, market control, and financial growth 
(Kayaga, 2007:6-7). 
Most informal sector firms focus on creating revenue on their own and 
maintaining revenue for further investment. In these instances, the primary aim 
of business in society, which is essentially the preservation and growth of 
human capital and well-being, is overlooked by informal companies (Kireenko 
& Nevzorova, 2015:560). 
Taxation does not always ensure that people are provided with public goods 
and services. Governments have varied and significant demands that are all 
based on scarce resources. Tax payment, however, is a shared responsibility 
of the government and all its citizens. To achieve the valuable products and 
services, each industry must assume its duty (Mutua, 2012:9). 
Environment conducive to businesses in the informal sector is the result of 





2.4.2 Informal sector perceptions of income tax 
Sometimes the shadow economy is regarded worthwhile by suggesting that the 
industry promotes a country's financial and social equilibrium. This perception 
may be misleading as it disregards criminal financial behaviours in the informal 
sector such as tax evasion. As a means of survival in the very volatile and 
hostile environment, the informal sector justifies tax evasion, among other 
financial offences (Kireenko & Nevzorova, 2015:560).  
Savings translates into financial strength and investment affordability. The more 
savings, the higher the investment chance and the greater the development of 
the economy. However, taxation decreases the quantity of savings in the 
economy (Akintoye & Tashie, 2013:224). High taxation will jeopardize 
economic growth. Taxation decreases disposable income which would 
normally be the source of investment in capital (Vedder, 2001:2).  Informal 
companies therefore view taxation as an obstacle to their future investment 
plans and successful development. 
Informal sector tax evading companies cited the pressure for survival caused 
by high tax rates, complicated legislation, elevated payroll taxes and labour 
costs (Capasso & Jappelli 2013:167). 
Informal economy enterprises can afford to acquire cheaper labour by avoiding 
payroll taxes, thereby lowering costs relative to formal sector. Therefore, 
informal businesses can pass on cost savings from inexpensive labour to 
customers by providing products and services at reduced rates. The strong 
rivalry in formal enterprises leads them to work in the informal economy or to 
risk being kicked out of business (Cule & Fulton, 2009:820). 
The perception of the informal sector in an economy characterized by poor 
governance of tax collection schemes, is that the tax system is corrupt, unfair 
and biased. This promotes low tax morale due to tax authorities ' unscrupulous 
functioning. The contention is hardly the cost of taxes, but tax evasion is 
increased as informal businesses recognize the tax authorities’ corruption and 
unequal administration operations (Fulton & Cule, 2009:820). 
Taxpayers will inevitably view the authority as reputable when tax officials have 




confident of the ability of the tax authority to efficiently implement tax laws and 
policies (Cule & Fulton, 2009:820). 
Poor performance and inability to deliver quality public goods and services in 
government organisations decrease business incentives to disclose and 
contribute their income (Capasso & Jappelli, 2013:168). 
Lack of democratic participation, low tax morale and institutional distrust also 
enhance the informal economy's size. If government fails to deliver the products 
and services requested by citizens, the democratic participation of the citizen 
will be impaired. It is essential that governments exhibit efficiency in order to 
motivate companies and individuals to fulfill their tax obligations (Capasso & 
Jappelli, 2013:168). 
The entrepreneur in the informal economy can evade tax responsibilities, which 
prevent access to credit markets. These entrepreneurs are therefore forced to 
use own wealth for capital formation. Informal enterprises are also more labour 
intensive compared to their low levels of production. In the formal sector, the 
businesses have some degree of access to credit markets and must pay taxes. 
Other disincentives for tax adherence, as mentioned above, are arbitrary and 
complex tax regulations, policies and processes (Capasso & Jappelli, 
2013:168). 
Governments in low-income countries are pushing companies into the informal 
sector by increasing formalisation associated costs. These obstacles are a 
barrier to private-sector dynamism as they undermine entrepreneurship. The 
emergence of informal business represents an escape by informal enterprises 
from formal status. This is because of bureaucracy and exorbitant formalisation 
costs. The informal sector furthermore resists formalisation and taxation 
because of perceived corruption and dysfunction of the state. However, tax 
evasion by the informal economy may also stifle entrepreneurship, as firms 
sometimes deliberately remain small to avoid regulators (Woodruff, 2013:2-12). 
Tax non-compliance in this sector is an outcome of a cost-benefit decision. The 
benefits are defined by the taxes that can be avoided and costs are represented 
by governmental deterrence measures and the probability of being penalised 




2.5  Weaknesses in tax management  
Admittedly, tax non-compliance in the informal sector is very high compared to 
formal sector companies that are much more visible to agents of KRA. Not only 
through taxpayers' behaviour and inaction, but also through tax administrators, 
non-compliance arises (Ofori, 2009:40).  
Compliance with and non-compliance with tax commitments is a consequence 
of political, legal and administrative actors ' choices as well as taxpayers ' 
behaviour. This suggests that tax non-compliance is not just the taxpayer's 
function, but also tax administrators’ responsibility (Ofori, 2009:40). 
A focus on the tax non-compliance behaviour of informal sector enterprises is 
critical when studying weaknesses in tax management. This section advances 
the typology of non-compliance hypothesis of Kidder and Craig (Kidder & Craig, 
1989:21-34). 
The variables of non-compliance are discussed below:  
Procedural non-compliance results from non-compliance due to tedious and 
elaborate tax payment processes. When compliance with laws and processes 
is time-consuming and resource-consuming, only a few informal entrepreneurs 
are prepared to comply (Kidder & Craig, 1989:21-34). 





Figure 2.1 Time to prepare and pay tax in hours 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicator ‘Time to prepare and 
pay tax in hours’, 2008 
In 2008, the World Bank created an indicator of global development as a "time 
to prepare and pay taxes" metric. It has produced diverse outcomes for various 
nations. For example, tax preparation and payment in high-income 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
required an average of 210 hours (Siehl, 2010:15).  
Kenya takes the longest time compared to the other sub-Saharan African 
nations; preparing and paying taxes in Kenya requires 417 hours. In South 
Africa (200 hours), Ghana (224 hours), DRC Congo (308 hours) and in Rwanda 
(160 hours). Taxpayers are also unwilling to participate in the tedious and time-
consuming tax process if the administrative burden is very significant. For 
instance, Yemen has 1,500 separate taxes, licenses and charges at distinct 
prices covering multiple bases. Compliance costs are likely to be exorbitant, 
resulting in exceptionally minimal likelihood of compliance (Siehl, 2010:15). 
Small to medium-sized businesses are suffering the most from high expenses 
of compliance. A study undertaken in South Africa disclosed that a deterrent to 
tax compliance is the paperwork that needs to be mastered in order to meet tax 




prefer to avoid or evade tax rather than cope with elaborate documentation and 
bureaucracy (Siehl, 2010:15). 
Ignorant non-compliance includes tax underpayment due to ignorance of 
complicated, varying and sometimes ambiguous tax schemes. There have 
been a number of modifications in Kenya, for example, since the Income Tax 
Act was enacted in 1973 owing to modifications in state fiscal planning (Income 
Tax Act). Volatile and frequent changes in tax legislation leads taxpayers and 
tax officials to confusion, resulting to tax evasion. Ignorance of the diverse 
complexities in tax systems complicate enlightenment and compliance (Kidder 
& Craig, 1989:21-34). Hiring qualified, competent and motivated tax officers as 
well as periodic training is critical in achieving tax compliance (Siehl, 2010:17-
18). 
Lazy non-compliance occurs when individuals are lazy in the areas of 
documentation, record keeping of their business transactions, hence non-
compliance (Kidder & Craig, 1989:21-34). It is therefore important for the tax 
authority to be vigilant and enforce tax compliance. Empirical studies propose 
that people inherently comply with tax requirements when they sense a high 
level of scrutiny by the tax authorities to avoid penalties and severe legal action 
(Siehl, 2010:14-15). 
Asocial non-compliance happens when taxpayers position their companies 
in ways that are undetectable. These include the use of cash transactions and 
frequent relocation to prevent attracting the taxman's attention (Kidder & Craig, 
1989:21-34). This can also happen when there are loopholes within the tax 
system promoting tax avoidance (Siehl, 2010:9). Some have defined tax 
avoidance as a legal means to reduce tax liability. As much as tax avoidance 
may seem legal, it goes against the spirit of patriotism and is undesirable (Fuest 
& Riedel, 2009:5).  
Symbolic non-compliance occurs when there is a protest against perceived 
injustice and inequities in tax legislation. This means refusing to pay tax as a 
protest against what is perceived as unfair tax legislation and abuse of tax 
revenue (Kidder & Craig, 1989:21-34). The taxpayer's morale is affected by a 




taxes when there is low quality or absence of service in exchange for taxes 
paid. When the tax system is unfair or with no accountability and transparency 
tax non-compliance in inevitable. This usually occurs in a weak fiscal jurisdiction 
and a corrupt legal system (Siehl, 2010:14-17). 
Social non-compliance is due to peer pressure and social influence among 
taxpayers. This occurs when a social network of individuals jointly refuses to 
pay taxes, citing bribery and corruption. Society protests because exorbitant 
tax rates do not result to personal gains (Kidder & Craig, 1989:21-34). Tax 
morale is not simple to implement; it is particularly hard in nations lacking an 
inherent culture of tax liability (Siehl, 2010:17). 
Brokered noncompliance takes place upon the advice of a knowledgeable 
expert such as a financial advisor, or a lawyer. The taxpayer is instructed on 
smart ways to avoid taxes and the resulting tax savings are then shared 
between the businessman and the expert. This can be mitigated if tax 
authorities offer tax incentives to encourage full disclosure (Kidder & Craig, 
1989:21-34).  
Habitual noncompliance arises over time when the taxpayer sets a habit of 
non-reporting of business transactions. This mostly occurs in an environment 
where there is low tax morale because the tax authority is perceived to exercise 
more ‘policing’ than ‘administrating’ (Kidder & Craig, 1989:21-34). 
2.6  Improving tax efficiency  
There is no single answer within the informal industry to the issue of tax 
avoidance and evasion. The strategy to curbing this issue will rely on the 
distinctive structure of a country's tax policy. An efficient strategy is a country-
specific strategy that is sensitive to tax avoidance and/or evasion triggers. The 
absorptive capacity is the rate at which people are responsive and receptive to 
interventions and/or changes instituted by government. Policymakers need to 
consider the absorptive capacity of the country when developing policies for tax 
reforms. Low absorptive capacity requires less ambitious policies for reforms, 
otherwise the effort will be a total failure. However, if the absorptive capacity is 





2.6.1 Tax administration 
Tax collection in Latin America and the Caribbean has risen by 30% over the 
past two centuries as a consequence of administrative changes.  
Currently, tax administrators have realised budgetary and technical 
independence in most nations. Tax authorities have skilled information and 
communications technology (ICT) employees, consequently, by means of 
technology, the role of tax collection is underscored with higher focus on all 
potential taxpayers (Corbacho et al., 2013:99).  
It is of paramount significance that tax officials design a streamlined system to 
improve the collection of revenue from informal sector tax. In relation to 
simplifying the scheme, it is recommended that the characteristics of the 
informal sector be taken into consideration in the design of tax systems. 
Redundant bureaucracy should be removed from the process of tax 
administration by offering all tax-related facilities in a one-stop-shop type setting 
(Moyi & Ronge, 2006:29). 
Having autonomy from influences from other governmental arms certainly 
affects tax agency tax collection effectiveness (Corbacho et al., 2013:99). The 
independence of the tax authority is critical to achieving effectiveness in the 
identification of tax liabilities, collection and prosecution of tax evaders. 
However, autonomy limits exist. The tax authority needs some political 
legitimacy and complete control of appropriate funds in order to exercise 
autonomy. It is probable that an independent tax authority will show excellent 
efficiency as it has a chance for efficient management procedures. However, 
autonomy is not a guarantee that the informal sector will meet tax obligation 
(Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003:17-18). 
Also important are economic, social and political considerations beyond the 
control of the tax authority. This is an essential factor when dealing with the 
informal economy for tax administrators (Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003:17-18). 
2.6.2 Tax policies 
Within each of the main tax categories, which include personal and corporate 
income, some redesigning is required to enable efficiency in collection. Levying 




while at the same time shrinking tax reliefs unless directed at addressing 
serious economic threats (OECD, 2010:1-2). 
Member States of the European Union (EU) review their tax policies on a 
regular basis with a view to improving tax policy designs in order to achieve 
budget surplus; job creation; economic growth; and fairness. In recent years, 
EU Member States have increased the general tax burden, albeit with reduced 
labour taxes on low-income earners.  
Passive income earners had a higher tax burden. Most countries have 
decreased tax relief and allowances. Taxes linked to consumption and the 
environment were also improved, although the impact of environmental taxation 
on the budget was very minimal. Member States relying on mortgage interest 
payments altered their schemes and removed the reliefs. Financing the relief 
of low-income earners became particularly costly and required re-examination 
of current policies to identify revenue-enhancing strategies without putting 
government resources at risk. Sustainable alternatives can be quite restricted 
in terms of tax relief for low-income earners. Lower income taxes can be either 
offset by raising other sources of income or by cutting government spending 
(European Commission, 2014:1-25).   
To enhance tax adherence, all EU nations focus on combating tax evasion and 
fraud. Measures have therefore been and are being instituted on an ongoing 
reform to achieve these goals. As of 2014, the tax burden in the EU was 
comparatively high, so member countries deemed attempts to decrease the 
burden on low earners a move in the correct direction (European Commission, 
2014:15-25).   
2.6.3 Outsourcing revenue collection function 
For the past 19 years, Mozambique has regularly subcontracted the private 
corporation "Crown Agents" to handle income collection on behalf of 
government. The country's income had risen by 40% within the first year. The 
agreement was intended to be a temporary one with the subcontracted 
company. By subcontracting Crown Agents, the government's purpose was to 




outsourcing turned out to be costlier and not less prone to corruption in the 
longer term (Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003:17-20). 
2.6.4 Salaries and wages 
Low wages and/or salaries can translate to low levels of staff motivation. 
However, in some instances, the tax system continues to flourish regardless of 
comparatively low wages, bribery and mismanagement. Wages and incentives 
are just one element that affects tax officers ' behaviour. In addition to 
competitive pay, internal control processes and staff behaviour, policies are 
essential in maintaining high integrity (Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003:19) 
2.6.5 Cost benefit analysis 
Compliance cost affects and determines informal business tax adherence. 
Compliance costs may include, but are not limited to, bookkeeping, cost of 
auditors for audited financial statements and postal costs. A majority of informal 
activities remain informal due to the high cost of compliance associated with 
formalisation, exacerbating tax evasion. PricewaterhouseCoopers and the 
World Bank revealed increased expenses of tax compliance in Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic in 2013. In their successive tax reforms, these two nations 
eventually integrated the feedback and observed important income gains 
(European Commission, 2014:107). 
2.6.6 Equity and efficiency 
Tax reforms involve extensive consideration of variables related to equity and 
efficiency. The tax benefit schemes in the EU nations in 2012 resulted in most 
countries experiencing market inequality. Increased personal income tax and 
tax base expansion among other reforms led in lower income inequality in many 
EU Member States. Voluntary compliance with taxes is a government concern. 
Therefore, when tax revenue officials make tax policy changes, they should 
prioritize taxpayers ' cost efficiency. The cost of taxpayer compliance with the 
tax liability should not be a deterrent to compliance (Siehl, 2010:26). 
A majority of nations have embraced progressive tax systems to further 
decrease income inequality. A progressive tax is a tax that increases the tax 




the rate of revenue earned If the tax base is expanded, the progressive taxation 
approach is fair and efficient (European Commission, 2014:107).   
2.6.7 Legal system 
The legal framework for enforcing tax demands is a critical perquisite. Tax 
regulations are quite unstable in developing nations. Frequent modifications 
lead to confusion for both taxpayers and tax administrators. The outcome is tax 
avoidance and evasion. The situation is aggravated further if there are rapid 
and frequent changes in tax laws (Siehl, 2010:17-18). 
2.7  Summary and deductions  
The question of whether informal economy taxation is justified has been the 
topic of debate for many years. Critics suggest that informal sector taxation 
produces minimal revenue compared to steep administrative costs and 
corruption associated with revenue collection from the sector. The proponents 
of taxing the informal economy advance that such taxation is critical in 
sustaining tax compliance and tax morale among other tax payers. There is 
some proof that formalisation can lead to development and greater profitability 
for informal enterprises. In addition, the informal sector's tax compliance will 
offer these companies moral authority to engage with the government on 
legitimacy, good governance, and political accountability issues. Recent study 
has highlighted that informal sector taxation can bring long-term and important 
advantages to the public value. It is suggested that taxation of informal 
enterprises will – ceterus paribus – result in increased revenue, economic 
growth and quality governance. It would also be an imperative catalyst for 
expanding political voice among the citizens, mobilisation and public 
accountability.  
In turn, tax avoidance by the informal sector can decrease the quality and 
amount of public goods and services. Small-scale activities, cash transactions 
and lack of record-keeping are the main factors why taxation in sub-Saharan 
African countries is challenging. Informal companies in South Africa, Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda do not meet tax obligations because they perceive the 
goods and services provided by governments as of poor quality, with little in 




These nations have strict laws on tax violation, but due to high-level corruption, 
no action is ever taken against non-adherence behaviour. 
Tax compliance is not the onus of taxpayers only, but a responsibility shared 
with tax administrations and other state agencies. Tax noncompliance can be 
the result of political and legal issues, among other administrative factors, as 
proposed by Kidder and Craig in their theory of typology of noncompliance.  
An efficient strategy to curbing the informal sector's tax evasion issue would be 
one that is country-specific and one that considers the absorptive capacity of 
each country. 
Taxation is an instrument for redistribution of wealth, social development, 
financial stability, and economic growth. However, informal sector sometimes 
perceives taxation as a plan to hinder growth because of observed corruption, 
and biased treatment by tax administrators. Taxation is also used as a 
regulatory tool to discourage certain companies that are compromising citizens 
well-being. A majority of people cooperate and adhere to tax requirements if 
they have faith in their governments to provide environments conducive to 
business growth and survival. Although, the informal sector, mainly being in 
small businesses, sometimes finds tax evasion as the only way to survive in 
highly volatile, expensive, and hostile business environments. However, tax 
evasion by these businesses is also a negative approach as it may stifle 
entrepreneurship and innovation because these firms remain in the shadows to 
avoid detection by tax authorities. 
Despite the KRA's attempts, challenges that remain have slowed the 
accomplishment of the completely integrated and modern tax scheme needed 
to boost income generation. Among the five existing taxation options, turnover 
tax is perhaps the best attempt so far to bring change in generating revenue 
from informal enterprises in Kenya. Technology is a significant contributor in 
improving revenue collections and expanding tax nets. Automation and 
integration of tax systems with other relevant online systems will mitigate 
evasion by sealing all the loopholes associated with tax noncompliance. 






Chapter 3: Characteristics and delimitations of the Kenyan tax system 
3.1 Introduction 
This third chapter unpacks Kenya’s tax incidences, legislation and policy 
imperatives, and the variations in taxpayer compliance. The section offers a 
wide overview of Kenya's tax system, the reforms that have occurred over the 
previous decades, and the current administrative structure. Since tax 
management is vital to taxation, it is important to investigate whether a method 
that can be recognized and measured follows its reform. 
The overall goal is to identify the lessons needed to model an appropriate and 
sustainable tax reform policy in Kenya and, ultimately, to suggest reform steps 
to model a strategy for sustainable tax management in Kenya. The critical part 
of this chapter involves the assessment of tax incidence and variations in tax 
reforms within different jurisdictions in order to determine a composite of 
feasible reforms to help expand tax base of informal sector in Kenya amidst 
economic, social and political challenges. 
3.2 Tax incidence in Kenya’s informal sector 
In theory, the incentive of a taxpayer to comply with a tax scheme relies on an 
evaluation of the comparative advantages and related compliance costs vis-à-
vis non-compliance. According to a report by the Institute of Economic Affairs 
analysing the Finance Bill 2018, one of the profound reasons why the players 
in the informal sector in Kenya were unwilling to remit taxes to the authorities 
is the general perception that the tax burden was too high. This fundamentally 
presents a significant challenge for KRA to create efficient processes to 
improve a tax compliance stance (Mpapale, 2014:6-8). 
From the outset, it must be clear that the sole objective of an efficient tax regime 
in the context of the informal sector is aimed at extending the tax net to a factor, 
however negligible. As the informal sector contributes to public coffers; it is not 
intended to suppress their growth or disproportionately burden them. 
Advancing legal and administrative tax reforms in the informal sector is by no 
means a policy directed at stifling development or the very presence of informal 
businesses. On the contrary, these reforms are intended to unlock the sector's 




stronger understanding of the need to expand the tax base by analysing the 
implications of a weak informal sector tax system in Kenya.  
3.2.1 Kenya Revenue Authority and informal sector taxation 
Kenya’s informal sector is too large to be ignored. There is a critical need to 
harness much-needed government revenue by taxing this very vibrant informal 
industry.  The tax revenue gap is defined as the difference between potential 
tax income and actual tax income within an optimal environment. Measuring 
the tax gap is difficult, but numerous reforms have been implemented to 
improve tax collection and administration in order to improve the Kenyan tax 
base. However, the remaining difficulties have slowed the accomplishment of 
a completely integrated and modern tax scheme needed to boost income 
generation (Mpapale, 2014:6-8). 
Kenya recorded an annual GDP of 1.68 trillion KShs in 2013, a 4 percent rise 
over 2012 as reported by the Kenya National Statistics Bureau (KNBS). Despite 
this trend, Kenya frequently suffers national budget revenue deficits. The state 
had a budget deficit of 4.8% of GDP in 2013. In 2019 there was still a budget 
deficit of 6.2% of gross domestic product (AF, 2020). 
The government through KRA has deliberately tried to reform the tax system to 
make it more responsive and effective in coping with tax evasion through 
transfer pricing and black economy activities (Mpapale, 2014:6-8). 
In 2012, KNBS ' financial study revealed that about 8.3 million individuals were 
employed by the informal economy. This translated to 75% of the labour force 
in the country.  The informal sector also accounted for 25% of the domestic 
GDP. More than 60 percent of the workers in the informal sector are aged 
between 18 and 35 years, with half of them being women. The informal sector 
reveals exponential expansion because of deregulation that has resulted in 
ease of entry and exit in the sector (Mpapale, 2014:6-8). 
Formal job opportunities are scarce to the extent that even extremely trained 
individuals resort to the informal economy. In addition, capital formation to start 
formal business is an extreme stretch for most Kenyans. There is also a 
significant population of unskilled workforce making formal jobs even more 




The primary reason Kenya's informal sector is unwilling to fulfill tax 
commitments is due to the perception of exorbitant tax burden. The incentive 
for taxpayers to comply with the tax requirement is determined by their 
evaluation of the benefits against compliance costs. This underlines that the 
predicament of tax evasion can no longer be restricted to technical and financial 
variables, but to taxation components of human perception. In the early 1990s, 
the informal sector's prospective revenue was approximately 4 percent of GDP 
on average. The tax authority had the chance to boost the sector's income by 
an amount equal to 4% of GDP. Kenya's GDP was estimated at KShs 1.68 
trillion in 2013; 4% percent of that is estimated KShs 67.2 billion. This amount 
if paid by the informal sector in 2013, the tax base would have been enhanced 
(Mpapale, 2014:10). 
The rigid tax policies and laws regulating the formal sector while leaving the 
informal sector unregulated give the informal economy an undue benefit. If 
authorities were to ensure equal and fair treatment, for example by ensuring 
that all informal companies are registered for VAT, the market would be levelled 
and competitive for both formal and informal companies. Tax justice would be 
achieved if the revenue authority taxed both the income of informal and formal 
staff. In addition to maximising income, there are other overwhelming reasons 
why the KRA should seek to control the informal sector in order to guarantee 
compliance (Mpapale, 2014:10). 
It is estimated that KRA will lose 300 billion KShs worth of prospective income 
from the informal sector annually. Income tax is regulated by the authority's 
provisions of the PAYE rules. PAYE is the tax tariff that employers are needed 
to collect and pay in advance by deducting earnings from staff wages (Masinde 
& Mwangi, 2010:14). 
By using a reference number known as the PIN, KRA recognizes taxpayers. 
Majority of informal sector organisations in Kenya are not registered by KRA; 
therefore, there is no reference for their companies within tax system. It is 





The launch of the Revenue Administration Reform and Modernization 
Programme projects has implemented a way to address tax problems. It was a 
result of the KRA Second Corporate Plan (2003/04–2005/06) and set the stage 
for the injection of momentum to consolidate the profits produced in tax 
administration.  
KRA made incremental steps towards transforming itself into a contemporary, 
completely integrated and customer-focused organisation during the era of the 
Third Corporate Plan (2006/07–2008/09).  
KRA Fourth Corporate Plan (2009/10–2011/12) and the Fifth Corporate Plan 
(2012/13–2014/15) have developed and implemented further reforms. The 
Sixth Corporate Plan (2015/16–2017/18) was intended for building taxpayer 
trust through improved taxpayer compliance facilitation.  
KRA introduced the iTax, a web-based system directed at improving national 
tax administration and providing services including electronic taxpayer 
registration, electronic filing and payment.  Regional support centres for KRA 
iTax were also established in some of the cities like Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, 
Nyeri and Eldoret (Revenue.go.ke, 2016). 
KRA also introduced a culture change programme to promote continuing 
attempts to modernize.  The goal is to help develop fresh cultures, attitudes and 
behaviours by concentrating on the' individuals ' aspect of change, as well as 
reinforcing environmental issues influencing employees (Revenue.go.ke, 
2016). 
The tax base in Kenya still has enormous potential for growth in the informal 
sector despite present efforts to seal income leaks. Kenya's tax structure was 
intended to depend on corporate tax; pay as you earn; withholding tax; and 
value-added tax as the main instruments of tax. The efficacy of these tax heads 
in the informal sector is investigated (Mpapale, 2014:12).  
3.2.1.1 Corporate tax 
The provisions of the Income Tax Act, cap 470 of Kenya's legislation, govern 
this. Both resident and non-resident businesses are subject to corporate tax. 





Corporate tax efficiency  
Corporate tax as a strategy for collecting income tax has absolutely no impact 
on the informal economy's company operations. This is because the tax 
instrument was intended to cover formal institutions with a properly specified 
management and reporting framework. Because the tax rate applies to a 
corporate’s taxable income, as per independently audited books of account. 
The informal sector lacks audited books due to required expertise and related 
expenses (Mpapale, 12:2014). 
3.2.1.2 Pay As You Earn 
PAYE is generally a tax scheme for the employer, under which a tax 
corresponding to the employee's remunerations is deducted and transferred by 
employer to KRA. PAYE tax incidence are borne by employees. In cases of 
default, employers are subject to penalties and tax amount is collected from 
them in cases where the employee is not complying with PAYE legislation 
(Mpapale, 12:2014). 
The third plan of the ITA describes the (graduate scale) tax ranges for which   
tax rate is computed.  
Table 2.1 Pay as you earn annual bands 
Income bands Rate in each shilling 
On the first KShs121,968 10% 
On the next KShs114,912 15% 
On the next KShs114,912 20% 
On the next KShs114,912 25% 
On all income in KShs466,704 30% 
Source: Paragraph 3, third schedule ITA cap 470 of the laws of Kenya 
PAYE tax efficiency 
KRA uses a unique identifier -PIN- to distinguish registered taxpayers. It is 




being that they are not in possession of PINs. PAYE strategy has not brought 
informal economy participants into the tax net insofar as it only recognizes 
employees and employers in the formal sector (Mpapale, 13:2014). 
3.2.1.3 Value added tax 
VAT is a tax on consumer goods provided or consumed in Kenya. The VAT Act 
in Kenya has experienced major reforms (Value Added Tax Act). The VAT Act 
cap 476 was a piece of law which led to significant income leaks due to 
continuous changes and implementation of supplementary laws and legal 
notices over time. In 2013, the VAT Act 2013 was eventually enacted with more 
precise and fair laws. Sadly, this simplification method has led to a rise in the 
tax burden on the public by taxing household goods (Mpapale, 2014:13).  
VAT efficiency 
Value Added Tax is largely inoperable as a tax system in the informal industry. 
This mechanism is highly formal, requiring that suppliers of ‘vatable’ goods and 
services be formally registered and issued with VAT certificate. Due to 
informality, this is extremely hard to accomplish. Finally, VAT Act minimum limit 
for enrolment, an average annual turnover of KShs 5 million, lock out the bulk 
of the informal sector's taxpayers far below this limit (Mpapale, 2014:14). 
3.2.1.4 Withholding tax 
Withholding tax (WHT) is a way of paying taxes by the payer of income rather 
than the recipient of the income to the government. The tax is therefore withheld 
or deducted from the receiver's income (Mpapale, 2014:14-15). 
Withholding tax efficiency 
While many of the institutions in the informal sector usually obtain withholding-
tax facilities, they cannot deduct this, because they are not registered within the 
KRA system (Mpapale, 2014:14-15). 
3.2.1.5 Turnover tax 
Presumptive taxes refer to the use of simplified and cost-effective methods for 
taxing companies and individuals that often evade tax, often by non-reporting 




Standard assessments are presumptive tax schemes in which a fixed lump-
sum tax is levied on taxpayers on the basis of the occupation or business 
activity in which they are engaged (Tadesse & Taube, 1996:6-12). Estimated 
assessments are presumptive taxes that depend on the tax authority 's 
estimation of the profits of the taxpayer; they are especially applicable to the 
taxation of commercial activities for which understatement of profit is persistent 
and pervasive (Tadesse & Taube, 1996:6-12). 
A presumptive tax regime can mean firms pay substantially lower tax rates than 
under the standard regime. This can reduce revenue and augment informality 
(Rao, 2014:20). 
Presumptive taxes are usually preferred for their administrative simplicity and 
economic efficiency. In Zimbabwe, informal sector presumptive personal 
income taxes (PIT) are horizontally inequitable compared with formal sector 
PIT. This is due to the rates built into the PIT system, whereas presumptive 
taxes are either lump sum or proportional turnover taxes. However, 
presumptive taxes are fairer compared with company income tax (Dube, 
2014:48-62). 
Zambia and Tanzania use turnover tax regime to tax the informal sector. 
However, unlike Zambia, Tanzania has progressive turnover tax system and its 
upper threshold is significantly lower. The presumptive tax has shown some 
gains in revenue generation from informal sector, nevertheless, the 
administrative costs associated with collection IN Zambia are very high 
(Taxation of the informal sector, 2018:4-5). 
The Financial Act 2006 implemented Turnover Tax (TOT). The TOT may be the 
greatest effort to generate revenue from informal sector in Kenya so far 
(Finance Act). 
TOT is for any business activity with a turnover of KShs 500,000, but does not 
exceed KShs 5 million for any year's revenue. TOT covers all businesses, 
professions, and any profitable activity. Therefore, nearly every activity of the 
informal economy is subsequently taxable. In Kenya the tax rate applied to TOT 




the extent of record keeping required under the TOT regime is significantly 
simplified (Mpapale, 2014:14-20). 
TOT efficiency 
The most significant advantage of turnover tax is that it provides a much more 
streamlined system for taxing the informal sector. Any extra administrative 
costs are prohibited because TOT guarantees streamlined tax computation that 
only depends on turnover sales (Mpapale, 2014:14-20). 
3.3 Kenya’s tax legislation and reforms  
In August 2010 following the enactment of the New Constitution of Kenya, the 
system of taxation represents the two-tier state structure-national and county 
governments. The national governments delegates to the regional counties 
certain fiscal powers and duties (Mutua, 2012:11-14). 
Under Article 209 of the 2010 Kenya Constitution, both the central and the 
county governments have authority to impose tariffs or increase revenue. The 
allocation of revenue accountability between the two levels of government is in 
accordance with the devolution structure. The structure guarantees that the 
national government is responsible for transactions with substantial tax 
grounds. The national government is responsible in particular for the collection 
of income tax, VAT, custom duties and excise taxes. The government must be 
able to redistribute national resources and stabilise the economy as the key tax 
system objectives. Article 209(3) authorizes the county governments to impose 
property taxes, entertainment tax and any other tax. Moreover, county councils 
can charge local-level levies (Mutua, 2012:14-20). 
Kenya's tax law is legally binding. The main tax laws in Kenya are provided for 
in Kenya's Constitution, Parliamentary Acts, and the different Financial Acts 
adopted each year. Article 210(1) of the Kenyan Constitution, 2010, stipulates 
that, except as allowed for by law, no tax or licenses may be implemented or 
revoked. The principal tax legislation comprises the Income Tax Act, Value 
Added Tax Act and the Customs and Excise Act. The statutes pertaining to the 
county tax include the Entertainment Tax Act, among others, which require 





Kenya's government embraced the 1986 Tax Modernisation Programme and t
he 1987 Budget Rationalization Programme. This was based on the 1986 
Session Paper No. 1 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth. This was 
initially designed in the African Socialism Session Paper No. 10 from 1965 and 
applied to planning in Kenya. The Modernization programme aimed to increase 
the public income base, while rationalisation engaged rigid fiscal checks on 
spending. In particular, the Modernization Programme aimed to increase 
income and decrease implementation and administrative expenses by means 
of minimal and rationalised tax prices and broader tax bases. The aim of the 
programmes was also to improve taxation by eliminating leakages, increasing 
computer use and monitoring in an effort to improve the organisational ability 
to handle tax policies by developing efficient mechanisms of database 
management (Gichuki, 2015:8-18). 
These targets were subsequently extended to include increasing the revenue-
GDP percentage to 28 percent; reinforce the development of the emerging 
investment markets; stress self-assessment schemes; strengthen training and 
customer service for taxpayers (Gichuki, 2015:8-18).  
In terms of administration and governance improvements, revenue collection 
has increased by approximately two percentage points of GDP between 2003 
and 2004. Since then revenue collection has been maintained at around 21 
percent of GDP, excluding the 2005/06 financial year, when it had not been 
achieved because of customs computerisation problems that resulted in 
reduced import duties and VAT on imports (Gichuki, 2015:8-18).   
In 2006/07, revenue was projected to rise from 20.7% to 22% by 2015, and 
maintaining that level until 2030. It could result in a substantial tax liability, 
unless more people are included in the tax base.  
The Kenya Vision 2030 does not, however, provide for particular policies to 
sustain a strong tax drive. In order to monitor and make suitable suggestions to 
reform the tax scheme for easy accomplishment of Vision 2030 the government 
formed a Tax Harmonisation Task Force. The fiscal gap is a significant key to 
establishing the overall reform approach. No extensive research and evaluation 




management changes in Kenya. The overall strategy to the revision therefore 
fails to comply with the fundamental principles. There are also indications of 
inconsistency in fiscal reform policies. This shows a haphazard approach 
without a fundamental layout. While the 1986 Tax Modernization Programme 
sought to increase the tax revenue-GDP ratio from 22% in 1986 to 24% by the 
mid-1990s and subsequently to 28%, Kenya's vision 2030 aims to increase 
from 20.7% by 2006/07 to 22% by 2015 and to maintain the revenue-GDP ratio 
by 2030(Gichuki, 2015:8-18).  
In Kenya, it takes longer than neighbouring countries to meet tax requirements. 
For a firm in Kenya, 417 hours is required, much longer than Burundi, Uganda, 
Rwanda and Tanzania, to calculate and pay all required taxes. The average 
global time is 286 hours. This leads to the problems of the tax system (Gichuki, 
2015:8-18).  
Many tax administration reforms have been introduced since independence, 
including;  
3.3.1 Personal Identification Number (PIN) 
This was designed for proper identification and tracking of taxpayers. Every 
taxpayer should register and his / her individual PIN be assigned. The PIN is 
needed when filing income tax declarations and other tax returns. A solid 
taxpayer recognition scheme is essential to excellent tax management. This 
involves controls such as ensuring that no PIN is allocated to more than one 
taxpayer. The PIN is linked to the taxpayers’ identity numbers as well as 
company registration numbers (Gichuki, 2015:8-18). 
3.3.2 Centralised tax agency 
In 1986, a tax reform agenda and the 1986 Session Paper No. 1 on Economic 
Management for Renewed Growth set the foundation of the development of 
KRA. Kenya Revenue Authority was created in 1995. This was in tandem with 
other sub-Saharan African countries which set up their own semi-autonomous 
revenue agencies. Amongst the latter are Ghana in 1985, Uganda in 1991, 
Zambia in 1994 and Malawi in 1995. The following countries have joined forces: 




2002, Sierra Leone-2002, Lesotho-2003, the Gambia-2005, and Mauritius -
2005 (Gichuki, 2015:8-18). 
3.3.5 Electronic Tax Register (ETR)  
The ETR was implemented through public notices of 15 December 2004, 
mainly public notices nos. 48, 49, and 50. The ETR was introduced to improve 
VAT collection following studies in Italy, Greece and Turkey (Gichuki 2015:8-
18). 
3.3.6 Certificate of tax compliance  
Everyone dealing with government offices is required to produce a certificate of 
tax compliance. This guarantees conformity. However, this will depend on the 
cooperation of other government agencies (Gichuki, 2015:8-18). 
3.3.7 Turnover Tax  
This was achieved by transferring taxpayers with sales below the 5-millon KShs 
annually from the VAT system to the turnover tax system, thereby simplifying 
their way of creating profits (Gichuki, 2015:8-18). 
3.3.8 Integrated Tax Management System (ITMS)  
This was one of the main programmes for 2009/10-2011/12 in the fourth KRA 
corporate plan. The goal was to ensure the full automation of all income 
departments. ITMS is based on the tax system in Chile (Gichuki, 2015:16-18). 
From the multiple projects it is evident that the state is more engaged in the 
growth and implementation of tax administration systems. They include 
Electronic Tax Register (ETRs), Simba 2005 (S2005S) system, and PINs. 
These schemes have mostly been purchased from other countries. The 
S2005S originated in Senegal; the ITMS was purchased from Chile; as a 
consequence of research trips to Italy, ETR was a concept from Greece and 
Turkey (Gichuki, 2015:18-20). 
These reforms experienced severe difficulties with their execution, both 
internally and externally. There is still a discussion on the level to which the PIN 
is applied to access public services. The impact of this is that there is a 
reduction of tax or an increase in tax collection costs (Gichuki, 2015:18-21). 




over the predecessors ' structures and procedures, which were often 
dysfunctional (Gichuki, 2015:20-28). 
3.4 Current challenges for tax policy reforms 
The several tax administration reforms undertaken in Kenya do not exhibit a 
comprehensive strategy, theme, policy or methodology. There has been no 
clear, deliberate and integrated reform mechanism to avoid haphazard 
implementation of reforms. The fiscal reform approaches to be implemented 
have also been inconsistent. African countries face a series of challenges in 
terms of tax optimisation and development objectives. Perhaps the toughest 
task to overcome is to discover the ideal equilibrium between business-friendly 
taxation and capital while leveraging enough revenues for the provision of 
public services which, in turn, leaves countries more appealing to investors. 
Total government revenues as a percentage of GDP have continuously risen in 
most African nations after an era of steady development between the mid-
1990s and the mid-2000s. The amount of domestic revenue–identified as 
government income and non-tax profits excluding subsidies–rose between 
2002 and 2007 by almost 4% of GDP, to an average of over 25% in 2007 for 
the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. Except for Nigeria and South Africa, 
government revenues as a share of GDP increased further across the continent 
from 18.8% for the years 1997/2002 to 25.4% in 2007 on average. 
Nevertheless, the increased tax revenue in the region was significantly 
influenced by natural resource revenues. This included revenues from taxes on 
petroleum and mining businesses. Revenues associated with non-resource 
activities increased by less than 1% of GDP over 25 years. This is even more 
significant looking at the consequences of the crisis in Africa, where in 2009 
economic growth was estimated to be only 2.8%, less than half of the estimated 
5.7% in 2008 and a significant drop in export revenue and a slowdown in 
investment in oil and mineral products. In comparison with the OECD countries 





3.4.1 Tax evasion 
In 2008, a US senate issued a report highlighting that banks located in tax 
havens cost US taxpayers some USD 100 billion a year in lost revenue. Despite 
strong US legislation, agencies and other processes to prevent tax evasion, 
leakages have been reported. If such capital flight occurs in regulatory 
frameworks commonly perceived as sound, then many more opportunities exist 
for evasive practices in countries with weak regulatory and legal environments. 
For Kenya, tax evasion contributes more than just to the current economic 
crisis. Tax evasion is one of the main obstacles to increasing the fiscal base 
and mobilising domestic resources (Pfister, 2009:4-17). The KRA is estimated 
to lose potential revenue to the value of KShs 300 billion from the informal 
sector annually. Tax revenue collected in 2013 would have been improved by 
KShs 67.2 billion if the tax authority had been able to tax the informal sector 
(Mpapale, 2014:10). 
3.4.2 Aid over-reliance 
Strategies that help African nations free from over-reliance on foreign 
assistance must be urgently innovated. To that end, the government of Kenya 
must build ability to mobilise domestic funds. Because of its sustainability, 
domestic revenue should be one of the main sources for fiscal space 
expansion, thereby decreasing reliance on aid (Pfister, 2009:4-17). Kenya has 
been dependent on foreign aid for capital and social investments as presented 





Figure 3.1 Foreign aid from United States 
Source: Department of State (United States) 
3.4.3 Investment climate and entrepreneurship 
Economic growth and a country's investment dynamics are mainly affected by 
fiscal policies. In order to manage and develop in tax systems, there is need for 
transparency. Developing nations often have complicated fiscal systems that 
dampen the business environment and impede development opportunities. 
Numerous surveys, including OECD research, indicate that increasing the total 
tax obligation can decrease growth. All in all, good fiscal strategy surges the 
business climate, promotes global trade, innovation and boosts economy 
growth (Pfister, 2009:4-17). 
In order to attract foreign investments, African countries face strong competition 
in relation to corporate income tax. In sub-Saharan Africa, fiscal incentives are 
now used more widely compared to the 1980s, as more than two thirds of 
Africa's countries provide tax holidays that attract investment. The creation of 
export zones with tax holiday opportunities has also risen. The IMF notes, 
however, that the developing countries often have tax incentives that do not 
necessarily increase investment rates if they are not coupled with other 




The probable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) reaction to the reorganisation of 
the host tax system relies heavily on a wider spectrum of circumstances in the 
host nation. Indeed, with low taxation as an instrument to attract capital, some 
surveys indicate that tax is less essential than infrastructure as a location 
variable. It should be pointed out that tax incentives, financial subsidies and 
legislative exemptions aiming at attracting foreign investors will not replace 
suitable overall policy initiatives (Pfister, 2009:4-17). 
In this respect, it is important not to rely heavily on indirect taxation, e. g. tariffs, 
VAT and export taxes and royalties. In a select number of African nations, 
indirect taxes create up most of the tax income. Kenya might recommend 
simplifying income structures by a fixed tax level, such as the 20% fixed 
commercial tax level passed by Egypt, to enhance revenue administration and 
distribution, as well as decreasing subsidies. This is in line with the latest 
changes in other fields of the business environment, as Mauritius and Rwanda 
have demonstrated. Simplified tax systems can also assist in flawless 
calculations of capital equity (Pfister, 2009:4-17). 
In Kenya, tax schemes are still complicated, despite latest changes. Some tax 
legislation is uncertain and manuals do not exist for scrutiny, which leaves tax-
enforcers too much discretion. For example, revenue officers may be discrete 
about significant choices, such as those relating to tax exemptions, tax liability 
determination, audit choice and disputes. Kenya, for example, was aiming to 
reduce tax burdens on both formal and informal businesses by introducing a 
single business permit (SBP) license in 1999. In reality, 17% of domestic 
revenues were rapidly lost relative to 7% loss of pre-single business permits. 
Recent reforms to simplify the SBP were designed to cut the costs of 
companies by an estimated USD 11 million annually. That shows that 
administrative viability is ultimately still a key consideration in any estimate of 
fiscal policy (Pfister, 2009:4-17). 
Economic formalisation is generally within the scope of any fiscal policy. Much 
of the African economy comprises the informal sector. Being outside the tax net 
prevents formal financing and credit schemes for African small business 
community, which is essential for growth and innovation. The elevated VAT-




sized enterprises (SMEs) in Africa. The choice of whether or not small 
businesses pay taxes is therefore driven by a simple cost-benefit analysis 
(Pfister, 2009:4-17).  
The KRA tax system's primary objective should be to promote economic growth 
and development. The fiscal policy should therefore stimulate and encourage 
investment and economic growth above all else. The tax policies and reforms 
within the informal sector should be tailored towards encouraging and inspiring 
investment and entrepreneurship for economic gain (Onyeka & Nwankwo, 
2016:156-160). 
3.4.4 Good governance 
Effective fiscal management is underpinned by effective governance, 
particularly since taxation provides an opportunity to enhance government 
accountability to citizens. An effective and efficient tax administration is a key 
component of a capable state. A strong tax regime also promotes good 
governance (Pfister, 2009:4-17).  
In general, good governance is benchmarked by a reasonable and clear tax 
scheme that is free from bribery and is governed by the rule of law. Co-
ordination between the central and local authorities is also crucial in 
administering tax policies. Improved cooperation of tax policy issues between 
central and local authorities as a cornerstone of excellent economic policy 
would indeed have beneficial effects on other policy areas. This is another 
justification why taxation is an integral component of the structure for 
development policy (Pfister, 2009:4-17). 
Taxation can serve to integrate citizens into the formal economy, enabling the 
provision of state benefits such as pensions, unemployment insurance and the 
protection of workers. This is especially crucial to Africa because the 
narrowness of the fiscal base has a serious impact on the tax rate enforced on 
the comparatively small formal sector. A significant frontier for African 
policymakers is the expansion of tax policy while offering renewed infrastructure 
and other public services in return. Some developing countries have corruption-
affected tax administrations, poorly trained and poorly paid officers. Improving 




through stronger service delivery; taxpayers’ education; effective use of 
automated systems; stronger tax administrations ' collaboration against tax 
evasion and active tax planning; and reinforcement of audit and capacity of 
human resources (Pfister, 2009:4-17). 
Kenya faces high levels of inequality in terms of income irrespective of relatively 
high level of democratic governance. There are low satisfactory and confidence 
levels on the quantity and quality of goods and services by government (Ali et 
al., 2014:829). 
3.4.5 Overreliance on tax 
Except for nations like the UK, the US, France and several others, taxation 
appears to be the primary source of economic backing in the majority of nations. 
Every other country almost looks to tax revenue as the ultimate public service 
provider. It is high time that Kenya government diversify sources of government 
revenue. For instance, in China and India they employ a wide array of revenue 
generating options. However, the nature of the economy and administrative 
capacity must be put into consideration, every country is unique. interventions 
may augment or constrain revenue generating capacity. In most instances the 
constraints result in governments relying heavily on a few tax instruments, often 
indirect in nature, which could create economic distortions and have serious 
welfare consequences (Abiola & Asiweh, 2012:100).  
3.4.6 Dilemma of equity and equality 
Equity, equality and simplicity are characteristics of a good tax system. These 
principles still hold today and even act as a guide for policy formulation. 
However, it is virtually impossible to accomplish everything within a single tax 
strategy; hence the proposition that there is no fair tax. This is because a tax 
that is effective could be unfair. An efficient tax may not necessarily be 
considered fair or one considered fair may not be effective (Abiola & Asiweh, 
2012:101). Kenya Revenue Authority has opportunity to improve the fiscal basis 
and the collection of revenue. In order to achieve important tax compliance, 
citizens must be segregated and appropriate care and intervention taken 




The rigid tax policies and laws of the government regulating the formal sector 
while keeping the informal industry unregulated give the informal economy an 
undue benefit. For example, if the government guarantees equal and fair 
handling, by ensuring that the VAT system registers all informal businesses, 
the market for both formal as well as informal businesses would be level. Both 
would compete for business opportunities while the government would access 
full revenue through the KRA. If the informal and formal income of staff were 
taxed by the revenue authority, tax fairness would be achieved. There are other 
overwhelming reasons, apart from maximising revenue, for the KRA's efforts to 
regulate the informal sector to achieve compliance (Mpapale, 2014:8-10). 
3.4.7 Poor tax data quality 
In the quest of a broader tax base and formalisation, poor quality of basic data 
for the optimal taxation and tax models have also been detrimental (Moyi & 
Ronge, 2006:11-38). In 2018 KRA admitted to having on its database, 8.1 
million taxpayers, out of which only 2.9 million had proficient records, 
representing 36 percent of taxpayers.  E-Government Development Index 
(EGDI) presents the state of E-Government development of the United Nations 
Member States. It presents E-government development at the global and 
regional levels. The EGDI includes access features like the level of 
infrastructure and education to reflect how a country utilises technology to 
encourage access to and inclusion of its people. Kenya is a middle EGDI 
country. The EGDI is categorized as very high, high, middle and low (United 
Nations,2014). 
3.4.8 Adverse politics 
An unfavorable political environment not conducive to reasonable tax strategy 
could deter major tax reforms. The political elite with high personal income, 
wealth and property can use their economic influence to oppose taxing on 
property and wealth. These difficulties discourage the establishment of an 
effective and efficient tax scheme (Moyi & Ronge, 2006:11-38). In order to 
promote continuing modernisation initiatives, the KRA is also attempting to 
introduce a cultural change programme.  The purpose is to promote new 




and by strengthening environmental issues for employees (Revenue.go.ke, 
2016). 
3.4.9 High income tax  
Corporate and personal income taxes create distortion. In some nations the 
system of taxation is designed solely to generate income and has a detrimental 
impact on the economy. The tax regime in some nations is organized only in 
the direction of income. The government cannot merely levy a nation to 
affluence; it does not boost economic development. Just as tax income is 
essential for a country, it is still hard for many individuals to honor their fiscal 
duty. Nobody likes to pay tax but for social welfare taxation is necessary (Abiola 
& Asiweh, 2012:100). Corporate tax has had totally no impact on the operations 
of the informal sector as an income generating policy. The tax instrument is 
designed to cover formal companies with a properly defined management and 
reporting structure (Mpapale, 2014:12). PAYE is an organisation's tax system 
by which the employer is expected to act on behalf of the government to transfer 
a corresponding amount of tax on compensation for the employee's services to 
the employer to the tax authority. Therefore, the PAYE strategy has not 
introduced the actors of the informal economy into the tax loop, in that only 
workers in the formal sector are recognized and those non-registered are 
excluded (Mpapale, 2014:13). 
3.5 Summary and deductions 
Over the years, the Kenya tax administration has been constantly reformed. 
These changes included legislation, policies, administrative and internal 
measures. The most remarkable of these was the establishment in 1995 of a 
semi-autonomous tax administration unit. 
The changes to Kenya's tax administration did not show a visible approach, 
policy or methodology. The fiscal reform approaches taken have been 
inconsistent. It has been hard to increase resources to satisfy government 
requirement for products and services because of the costs of implementing a 





Developing nations usually have a small tax base, and the income tax is applied 
to a comparatively small proportion of the population. In order to broaden the 
tax base and take a large portion of the population into the formal economy, 
and simultaneously to reduce the over-reliance on international and volatile 
capital inflows through foreign aid, tax reform must be encouraged. In all 
measures of tax policy, administrative effectiveness continues to be a key 
consideration. 
An assessment of the variations and challenges in taxpayer compliance within 
the revenue authorities and agencies in different regions and countries in the 
world, proposes that a blend of administrative, economic, social and political 
interventions are necessary for Kenya to attain optimal revenue generation from 
its informal sector. 
It is therefore critical to determine whether Kenyan reforms follow an identifiable 
and measurable process.  
Chapter 4 provides in-depth analysis of advances necessary for Kenya’s 




Chapter 4: Analyses of advances necessary for the collection of informal 
sector revenue to enhance the public value 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Literature study and content analysis 
Before dissecting the theme of this chapter, it is imperative to highlight the 
terrain of literature that informed this study. Of equal importance is a short 
methodological explanation in this study. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
primary objectives of this study were (i) to provide introduction to informal sector 
and taxation in Kenya; (ii) to understand the informal sector and taxation: A 
Literature Study; (iii) to critically review characteristics and delimitations of the 
Kenyan tax system; (iv) to analyse advances necessary for informal sector 
revenue collection to promote public value; and (v) to progress results, 
conclusions and recommendations. The following research question informed 
this study: How does the income tax system structure ensure informal sector 
contributes equitably to revenue generation and public value enhancement? 
4.3 Literature study 
The literature study was meant to provide appropriate response to the research 
question through rigorous literature interrogation. From the scrutiny of debates 
of the various theories, economic deterrence theory emerged as a key causal 
variable of tax compliance or non-compliance by the informal sector. This 
theory posits that the choice on compliance by taxpayers is based on evaluation 
of costs and benefits. Taxpayers consider the compliance benefit vis-à-vis 
compliance costs. Procedural non-compliance results from non-compliance 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in-depth analyses of advances 
necessary for informal sector revenue collection to promote public value. The 
analyses cover the causes for informal sector tax evasion in Kenya.  The study 
also examines budget gap in Kenya based on statistics in the 2015/16–
2017/18 budget reports. Figure 6 investigates the composition or sources of 
tax revenue and the effectiveness of diverse tax instruments in informal sector 
taxation. Lastly, the matrix in Table 4 analyses some challenges and 




due to tedious and elaborate tax payment processes. When compliance with 
laws and processes is time-consuming and resource-consuming, only a few 
informal entrepreneurs are prepared to comply. Compliance with and non-
compliance with tax commitments is the consequence of political, legal and 
administrative actors’ choices as well as taxpayers behaviour. A key 
contributory variable for people's choice to participate in the informal economy 
is also the provision and, in particular, the quality of public goods and services. 
This suggests that tax non-compliance is not just a loss of revenue, but also 
detrimental for public value. A focus on the tax non-compliance behavior of 
informal sector is critical when addressing weaknesses in tax administration.  
The researcher developed the following typological theory to support this causal 
hypothesis showing that low compliance costs enhances and improves tax 
compliance for the public good. 
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Avoiders have low motivation in complying with tax obligations and will opt for 
avoidance citing high cost of compliance.  
Evaders are those non-compliant irrespective of low cost of compliance leading to loss 

























Adherers are exposed to high cost of compliance and still exhibit high level of 
compliance. These are likely to be multinational companies that can afford to comply 
irrespective of the costs because these costs can be passed on to their customers. 
Proponents are the taxpayers that experience low compliance cost hence highly 
comply with tax obligations. Ideally, these are informal sector businesses because they 
usually prefer lower business costs. Tax non-compliance in the informal sector is an 
outcome of a cost-benefit decision. The researcher proposes that when implementing 
tax policy reforms, KRA should consider implementing this theoretical concept. 
4.4 Research methodology applied  
This research follows a qualitative method and has been carried out using 
published literature, theories, concepts and numerical analyses. In order to 
determine the potential implications of choices and behaviour, secondary data 
were collected and analysed. Comparison of distinct theories and methods 
used to enhance tax collection from the informal industry was also used in the 
comparative and cross-sectional study. The research was performed to 
maximise the advantages of both qualitative and quantitative methods by using 
methodological triangulation. 
4.5 Content analysis  
The analysis covers the causes for informal sector tax non-compliance in 
Kenya. It also examines Kenya’s budget deficit using Development Initiatives 
report, Based on statistics in 2015/16–2017/18 budget documents. It further 
investigates the composition or sources of tax revenue and the effectiveness of 
diverse tax instruments in informal sector taxation. Lastly, the matrix analyses 











4.5.1 Analysis of Tax evasion by the Informal Sector in Kenya 
The findings as presented in Table 1.1 were determined through a study 
conducted by Ali et al. (2014).  
In this Chapter the research paper focuses on analysing whether the variables 
presented in Table 1.1 in Chapter two are reason for tax evasion in Kenya. 
An eight percent contribution to tax evasion was caused by the unfair tax 
system, because the informal companies in Kenya perceived the tax system as 
unfair and biased. 
One in five informal businesses in Kenya had low tax morale due to exorbitant 
taxation.  
The perception that the taxes are unaffordable was the most significant 
influence on compliance or non-compliance with tax liabilities by most informal 
companies. 
Many individuals and companies have failed to meet tax obligations in Kenya 
because of the low quality and quantity of products of public interest and 
government facilities. 
One out of ten government officials is corrupt, which has negative 
consequences, because most informal firms would encourage tax evasion by 
citing state officials’ theft of revenue. 
Kenya has high detecting ability and stringent tax violation laws; 98.5% of tax 
evaders felt that legal action would be taken against them if they were to be 
known. 
4.5.2 Analysis of Kenya’s budget deficit 
The government budget balance necessary for spending on public goods and 
services (Bt) in a given year t depends on the government revenues (Rt) and 
expenditures (Et) for that year: 
Equation 4.1 




If Bt>0, then there is a budgetary excess for that year, because it is more tax 
collected than spent by the state. If Bt < 0, a budget deficit indicates that the 
state has invested much more than taxation has generated. 
 
Equation 4.2 
Bt = Rt - Et 
Bt = 1.7- 2.29 
Bt = -0.59 
Bt < 0 
An analysis of Figure 1.1 using the formula above shows that in 2018 the 
Kenyan budget suffered a deficit because Bt < 0. The government spent more 
than it generated through taxation. A positive government budget balance was 
necessary for spending on public goods and services (public value promotion). 
4.5.3 Analysis of effectiveness of varied tax instruments in informal sector 
taxation 
In Chapter 2 it was indicated that tax revenue in Kenya was estimated to be at 
20.1 percent of GDP in 2011. Although this proportion was much greater than 
in most African nations, Kenya's tax burden allocation was very irregular, 
leaving a significant part of the economy untaxed. It raised a 3 percent flat rate 
on turnover to substitute both income tax and VAT.  
Significant attention was given to creation of a simplified ‘single permit’ for small 
businesses, resulting in improved conditions for small businesses and 
encouraged some degree of formalisation. However, KRA has no record for the 
bulk of the informal businesses in Kenya, hence no reference in the authority’s 
system. Efficient taxation of revenue is becoming progressively hard.  
Recent study shows that newly registered firms have, in some cases, continued 
to be subject to corruption and harassment by public officials. However, with 












Composition of Total Tax Revenue in Kenya










Figure 4.2 Composition of total tax revenue in Kenya 
Source: KRA 
In Chapter 3, the effectiveness of income tax (corporation and PAYE), VAT, 
withholding tax and turnover tax are discussed. It was shown that despite the 
focus by the KRA in generating revenue through all the above mentioned tax 
heads in, turnover tax (Other Taxes) presented greater efficiency. It is the best 
way to broaden the tax base in the informal industry.  
4.5.4 Analysis of challenges for tax policy reforms in Kenya 
Table 3.1 Challenges for tax policy reforms in Kenya 
 Institutional / 
Administrative 
Economic Social  Political 
Tax evasion √ √ √ √ 
Over dependence on 
aid 
 √ √ √ 
Investment climate & 
enterprise 
 √ √ √ 
Threatened good 
governance 








Equity & equality 
dilemma 
√ √ √ √ 
Poor quality tax data √   √ 
Unfavourable politics    √ 
High corporate and 
income tax 
√ √  √ 
 
The Table 4.1 above summarises the challenges that the KRA faced in tax 
reforms. The challenges were institutional, economic, social and political. Most 
of the limitations in Chapter 3 were beyond the institution and/or administration 
of the KRA. The delimitations were as a result of combined institutional, 
economic, social and political reasons.  
Over the years, Kenya's taxation system has been subject to several constant 
changes. The reforms however were mostly institutional. There were also some 
economic, social and political reforms. The most notable were institutional 
reforms within the KRA administrative arm. The reforms lacked discernible 
synergy and had numerous inconsistencies.  
The analysis in Table 4.1 indicates that the interventions for tax reforms in 
Kenya necessitate recognition of interrelation, interconnection and complexities 
of challenges within informal sector. 
There are multiple facets to the effectiveness of fiscal reforms to promote public 
value. The finest strategy for sustained growth is stable and transparent 
institutional, economic, social, political and legal framework and integration of 
international best practice. 
4.6 Summary and deductions 
The effectiveness of tax reform in promoting public value, investment and 
economic growth is generally uncertain. A robust and consistent administrative, 
cultural, financial, political, legal and regulatory structure and implementation of 




sustainable advancement. Some objectives, such as those that encourage 
regional development, are more justifiable than others as a basis for generating 
more revenue, especially from the informal economy. Not all fiscal reforms are 
equally effective. Administrative interventions have the most comparative 
merits, followed by social, economic and political factors which serve to 
complement administrative efforts. A consideration of both internal and external 
environments is essential when developing tax strategies and reforms. Many 
factors that have an impact on tax reforms and, in turn tax compliance by 
taxpayers is considered in this chapter. Therefore, when administrative and 
managerial arrangements are made relating to tax issues and how they are 
applied, more successful results can be achieved if the sensitivity of taxpayers 
is taken into consideration. 






Chapter 5: Proposed recommendations for tax reforms in the informal 
sector 
The final chapter consists of the presentation of analysed and summarised 
research findings. Recommendations are made on how to improve informal 
taxpayers’ perceptions and conclusions on whether the study meets the 
research objectives. The study limitations are also highlighted. 
5.1 Introduction: research findings 
Tax administration and policy should be among the greatest concerns for any 
developing country. Efficiency in its tax collection procedures and a fully 
compliant tax base are the targets of tax administration. From the propositions 
in the previous chapters, Kenya needs to urgently address the problem of tax 
evasion in the informal sector which is not only a threat to the economy, but is 
also slowly affecting provision of public goods and services necessary for public 
value. 
The state and its officials are able to take several measures to enhance 
compliance. 
5.2 Improving outcomes 
This last section discusses a series of efforts to reform tax systems that 
encourage compliance for public value augmentation. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 The causal and outcome hypothesis 
5.2.1 Institutions and technological incentives 
Although policy choices are critical, the success of any tax system is based on 
the efficiency of fiscal administration implementation. The tax administrators 
are a powerful and critical instrument because they can block or sabotage the 
implementation of reform. 
Although the policy, administrative and technical changes are well-defined, 
there has been comparatively restricted attention to the politics of that reform. 
This partly represents the constant uncertainty regarding the advantages of 
Low Tax 
compliance cost




extending informal sector taxation. There is strong support for the need to 
reform and strengthen current procedures so that they are reasonable and 
more effective in attaining informal sector taxation as a public value instrument. 
Politics, however, is a key catalyst for its capacity. The latest study results 
reveal that the absence of political will is also a significant barrier to informal 
tax reform. These proposals are here developed. These factors that may shape 
incentives for firms to formalise. 
5.2.1.1 Privatisation of tax administration 
Privatisation is generally a strong incentive for collection maximisation, but in 
reality is susceptible to corruption while not doing much to promote negotiation, 
voluntary compliance or more productive interaction between state and society 
(Joshi et al., 2014:1341). The primary reason is that corruption is reduced and 
the method of income collection is simplified. In some instances, however, 
outsourcing has been costlier and not less prone to bribery (Fjeldstad & Rakner, 
2003:17-20). KRA can also delegate collection of taxes to trade unions and 
other informal firms’ associations (Joshi & Ayee, 2009:48-76).  
5.2.1.2 Disruptive FinTech reforms 
It involves using FinTech, for example, mobile phones to fulfill tax requirements. 
In Kenya, there is an advantage of mobile phone money transfer (Mpesa) 
administered and managed by Safaricom, one of the major tax compliant 
telecommunication firms. Money transfers using this service is the main mode 
of money transfer for a significant part of the informal sector. The Kenya 
revenue authority can work with Safaricom and other telecommunication 
service providers to access every transaction by a registered phone holder 
and/or business. The mobile phone money transfers should be limited to 
business transactions that are tax compliant.  The government should work 
together with other stakeholders through the Communications Authority of 
Kenya to include registration by the revenue authority as a requirement and 
qualification for any business enterprise to use the mobile phone money 
transfer services. This should definitely make a significant impact on revenue 
generated by the taxman. However, this should be achieved in an appropriate 




5.2.2 Institutions and economic incentives 
A major area of research considers formalisation to be a rational choice. 
Enterprises adopt rational and informed decisions that support their goals. 
These firms formalise when the economic advantages of formalisation exceed 
the cost (McCulloch, Schulze & Voss, 2010:18-24).  
Consequently, in order to convince the informal sector regarding formalisation 
and entering the tax net may depend on addressing the broader costs and 
benefits of formalisation (Zinnes, 2009:32-40). 
5.2.2.1 Periodic tax reforms 
To achieve a budget surplus for financial development, job creation and fair tax 
governance, the tax officials must review fiscal measures periodically to 
enhance fiscal strategy models. Periodic reforms provide opportunities to re-
examine existing policies to determine strategies for increasing revenue without 
jeopardizing economic growth. In the fight against tax evasion and tax fraud, 
continuous consultative interventions are essential to improve compliance 
(European Commission, 2014:1-25).   
5.2.2.2 Fiscal decentralisation 
This scenario relates to a transfer of revenue collection from the central 
government to the local district administration for better proximity with informal 
businesses. This aims to reduce compliance associated costs and improve tax 
collection effectiveness. Fiscal decentralisation also gives independence to 
local counties, which are therefore fully responsible for collecting and spending 
income. Financing their own developmental agendas ensures that the districts 
maximise efforts to access and extract full potential from the tax bases, which 
includes income of both formal and informal sectors (Corbacho et al., 2013:80). 
The tax reforms must determine which revenue functions and agencies that are 
best centralised, those that should run concurrently and which are better placed 
under the scope of decentralised levels of government (Onyeka & Nwankwo, 
2016:161-163). 
The local governments have no influence on national economic policies and 




5.2.3 Institutions and social incentives 
This approach stresses the involuntary nature of informality, as opposed to 
rational calculations of the cost-benefit approach (Joshi et al., 2014:1326-
1339). 
5.2.3.1 Absorptive capacity consideration 
The absorptive capacity is the rate at which people are responsive and 
receptive to interventions and/or changes instituted by government. No one-
size alternative to combat non-compliance is available. Tax reforms and 
strategies rely on a particular and distinctive income distribution framework in 
a country. A country-specific and responsive strategy to tax failures is an 
efficient one. It is imperative for tax reform to match the absorptive capacity of 
a country when developing policies for tax reforms. Countries that exhibit low 
absorptive capacity require less ambitious reforms, otherwise the effort will fail, 
but if the absorptive capacity is high, the reforms will be successfully embraced 
by the citizens (Siehl, 2010:25). 
5.2.3.2 Equity and equality 
Tax reforms require serious consideration to achieve equity and equality. A 
better tax system is one that supports a tax burden that is directly proportional 
to the level of income earned by the citizens in the labour market. The 
progressive system of taxation is fair, but it can only be effective if the tax base 
is broadened (European Commission, 2014:107). Taxpayers meet tax liabilities 
as soon as they think that they all conform with the same tax rules and 
requirements. When citizens perceive equality and fairness in how tax 
obligations are administered by tax authorities they are more likely to be tax 
compliant themselves (Ali et al., 2014:829-830).  
5.2.3.3 Collective action and state–society interaction 
In order to encourage voluntary compliance by the informal sector, tax policy 
formulation should be undertaken after due consultation and collaboration with 
all the stakeholders. The gap between the taxpayers and the revenue agencies 
usually is so wide that policies are made and forced down on the taxpayers 
without due consultation. Tax policies should be welcomed by all taxpayers for 




stakeholders by government would be perceived as a form of openness and 
sincerity, thereby reducing the problem of trust which has bedevilled tax 
administration. A public-private partnership between government and informal 
sector businesses is key if full trust and compliance by the taxpayers is to be 
achieved. The informal sector needs to be engaged in the development of 
strategies that influence both individuals and their companies. Although the 
formal sector is usually well known and policymakers deal with their complaints, 
the informal sector is not contacted because they are not formally registered. 
Like every other profit-oriented business, the structure of tax administration 
should be customer oriented (Kanyi, 2014:616-620). 
5.2.4 Political and social incentives 
This final approach complements the ones outlined above. This approach 
seeks to focus additional attention on politics and the nature of the relationship 
between the state and informal sector operators (Daly & Spence, 2010:15-21). 
Over and above a simple cost-benefit analysis, formalisation policies need to 
acknowledge and address the three key strategic problems of information, 
credibility and coordination (Daly & Spence, 2010:15-21). 
The dissemination of information is essential because the informal sector 
taxpayers do not generally know of the programmes, or comprehend the 
formalisation criteria. This is a challenge that is unique to every country 
although quite prevalent in most developing states. There is a significant need 
for states to adopt strategies that focus on outreach and taxpayer services 
(Jaramillo, 2009:23-28). 
Cooperation is important because the interests of companies are only to 
formalise when they are fairly sure that a large proportion of other non-partisan 
companies that compete with them do so. In Ghana, the state negotiated on 
taxation issues with informal sector operators through associations, this 
improved administrative effectiveness and compliance (Joshi & Ayee, 2009:48-
52).  
Willingness and ability by the state to negotiate and bargain with multiple small 
collective businesses and actors in the economy is also necessary in achieving 




collective bargaining, reform champions who wield sufficient political influence 
are necessary to overcome entrenched resistance, otherwise successful reform 
is unlikely (Heredia & Schneider, 2003:17-26). 
5.2.4.1 Government legitimacy 
The state should provide the informal sector a reason to bear taxes, through 
instituting policies that make it possible to gain from the revenue received by 
government. By this, people would give more when they see what their taxes 
are doing for them (Ndaka, 2017:84). 
5.2.4.2 International and regional cooperation  
International and regional attempts have been made to enhance domestic fiscal 
changes. However, actions at global stage must be followed at national stage 
by suitable domestic policies. Domestic tax matters and international modes of 
tax evasion, for example transfer-pricing, cannot be unilaterally resolved by a 
given country. Taking into account the small income in many developing 
countries, the income deficit owing to tax incompliance, mainly by the informal 
sectors, caused serious issues when financing vital domestic and global public 
value programmes.  
Global networks are essential to data sharing, and best practices strategy in 
order to enhance global and national collaboration in tax policies. Regional 
networks are also necessary as they help to exchange best practices between 
emerging and advanced nations (GTZ Sector Programme Public Finance, 
2010:30-33).  
6 Summary and conclusions  
6.1 Suggestions for Future Research 
Composite datasets that encompass all taxable facilities in informal sector often 
produce impartial outcomes. Thus, while the findings demonstrate strong 
degree of confidence in the link between tax compliance by informal sector and 
tax income generation, there is need to interrogate further the non-compliance 
by formal sectors. Better knowledge of certain impacts would involve the 
individual examination of formal business activities that transpire through the 




its origins often forces administrative organs to change their focus rapidly and 
frequently haphazardly, creating organisational turmoil and significantly 
disadvantaging administration. Finding the picture of a fiscal administrative 
structure capable of adapting methodically and effectively to fiscal policy crises 
would be highly fascinating. 
6.2  Conclusion 
This study was undertaken to assess income tax from the informal sector as 
means to afford enhanced public value in Kenya. 
The aim of this thesis was to review and assess study centred on future income 
development and the advantages of informal sector fiscal governance; to 
consider appropriate approaches to tax informal sector companies and to 
explore organisational and policy environmental obstacles to appropriate 
reforms. The main focus of this thesis was the analysis of the studies. The 
ultimate interest was not primarily to advocate for or against expanded taxation 
of the informal economy, but to consider how these systems could be made 
more effective and equitable. 
The research objectives for this study were examined. Chapters 1 and 2 
provided introduction and understanding of informal sector and taxation. 
Chapter 3 outlined characteristics and delimitations of the Kenyan tax system. 
Analyses of advances necessary for informal sector revenue collection to 
promote public value were also presented in Chapter 4. 
The existing literature suggested that the effectiveness of tax reform in 
promoting public value, investment and economic growth is generally 
questionable. Therefore, best strategy for sustained promotion of taxation of 
informal sector and public value is to provide stable and transparent 
institutional, social, economic, and political framework and put in place a tax 
system that accommodates the views of all stakeholders and one that is 
economically viable. 
The last chapter has also presented the main summary of the research findings, 
and has concluded with useful suggestions for future research. Conclusions 




recommendations are made on how to improve perceptions held by taxpayers 
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